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INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court lies at the intersection of youth policy and
crime policy. How should the legal system respond when the kid
is a criminal and the criminal is a kid? Since juvenile courts’ creation more than a century ago, they have evolved through four
periods: the Progressive Era (1899–1960s), the Due Process Era
(1960s–’70s), the Get Tough Era (1980s–’90s), and the contemporary Children Are Different Era (2005–Present). 1 In each period, juvenile justice policies have reflected different views about
children and crime control and appropriate ways to address
youths’ misconduct. With the U.S. Supreme Court recognizing
again that children are not miniature adults, we have an opportunity to enact policies for a more just and effective justice system for youth.2
Competing conceptions of adolescents—immaturity and incompetence versus maturity and competence—and differing
strategies of crime control—treatment or diversion versus punishment—affect the substantive goals and procedural means
that juvenile courts use. Substantively, conceptions of youths’
culpability or criminal responsibility affect juvenile courts’ decisions to detain and sentence delinquents, transfer youths to
criminal court, and sentence children as adults. Competence focuses on youths’ capacity to employ rights, ability to understand
and participate in the legal process, ability to exercise Miranda
rights, competence to stand trial, and ability to exercise right to

1. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS]; BARRY
C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (2017) [hereinafter FELD, EVOLUTION OF
JUVENILE COURT]; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE:
A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 32–48 (2013) (outlining the historical context of
juvenile courts in the United States); ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008).
2. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (holding that children
are constitutionally different from adults).
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counsel and right to a jury trial. The historical epochs of the juvenile court reflect the differing views of youths’ culpability and
competence.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the transition from a
rural agrarian to a manufacturing economy increased immigration, fostered rapid urbanization, and posed problems of assimilation and integration. 3 During the Progressive Era, upper and
middle class child-savers promoted a social construction of children as vulnerable, immature, and dependent, requiring protection and supervision. 4 Positivist criminology attributed criminal
behavior to external antecedent forces and Progressive reformers adopted discretionary policies to rehabilitate offenders: probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and juvenile courts.5
They created a separate justice system to shield children from
criminal courts, jails, and prisons. Two goals animated juvenile
courts’ creators: an interventionist rationale and a diversionary
one. 6 The more-expansive interventionist vision expected juvenile courts to identify causes of youths’ misbehavior, to intervene, and to promote their development into responsible adults. 7
Juvenile courts’ less-articulated diversionary purpose was to
minimize the harms the criminal justice system inflicted on
young people. They could accomplish their diversionary goal
simply by providing an alternative to criminal courts, even if
their rehabilitative goal proved more elusive. Juvenile courts
melded the new ideology of childhood with the new theory of
crime control, introduced a judicial-welfare alternative to remove children from the criminal justice system, and promised
individualized treatment in a nonpunitive child welfare system.
Juvenile courts’ rehabilitative mission envisioned a specialized judge trained in social work and child development whose
empathy and insight would enable him to make dispositions in
3. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 17–45; DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE
MAKING (2004).
4. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 46–78; ANTHONY M.
PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977).

5. See generally Francis A. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 25 (1964); ROTHMAN, supra note 3.
6. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1;
Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2477, 2481–84 (2000).
7. See Zimring, supra note 6, at 2480.
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the child’s best interests.8 Progressives defined the court’s jurisdiction broadly to include youths accused of crimes, noncriminalstatus offenders at risk to become delinquents, and abused and
neglected children.9 Juvenile courts’ rehabilitative dispositions
focused on youths’ future welfare rather than their past offenses
and imposed indeterminate sentences that could continue for the
duration of minority. The courts’ founders conceived of children
as immature and irresponsible and opposed procedural safeguards which could impede open communication between judge
and child. 10 Progressive reformers intended juvenile courts to
discriminate: to control poor and immigrant children, to assimilate and Americanize them, and to distinguish between their
own children and other people’s children.11 While probation was
the disposition of first resort, the institutions to which judges
disproportionately committed poor and immigrant children more
closely resembled youth prisons than clinics.
Despite the Progressives’ rehabilitative aspirations, the
1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement issued a task
force report on juvenile delinquency and youth crime revealing
juvenile courts’ procedural deficiencies, inadequate correctional
institutions, and racial disparities.12 Drawing on its critique, the
Supreme Court in In re Gault highlighted the disjunction between juvenile courts’ rehabilitative rhetoric—long used to justify the dearth of procedural safeguards—and the reality of court
and correctional practices. 13 Mandating procedural safeguards,
the Court envisioned youths as competent to exercise legal rights
and to participate in an adversarial system. 14 Subsequent decisions further criminalized delinquency proceedings. In re Winship required states to prove delinquents’ guilt by the criminal
law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 Breed v.
Jones applied the ban on double jeopardy based on the functional
8. See generally TANENHAUS, supra note 3; Allen, supra note 5.
9. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 32.
10. See e.g., FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 33–38.
See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1.
11. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; ROTHMAN, supra note 3.
12. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF ’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 77–84, 91–107 (1967)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM’N]; see also FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE
COURT, supra note 1, at 10.
13. 387 U.S. 1, 13–57 (1967). See infra notes 90, 144, 148–50, 248–33, 299
and accompanying text.
14. Gault, 387 U.S. at 56.
15. 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970). See infra notes 133, 315 and accompanying
text.
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equivalence of criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. 16
However, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied delinquents the constitutional right to a jury trial available to criminal defendants
because it might adversely affect juvenile courts’ informality,
flexibility, and confidentiality.17 Although granting delinquents
some procedural rights might impair juvenile courts’ ability to
intervene in children’s lives, safeguards would not impede their
ability to divert youths and avoid the harms of the criminal justice system. But granting delinquents some procedural safeguards legitimated increasingly punitive penalties that fell most
heavily on minority offenders. 18 The Court’s due process revolution coincided with a synergy of campus disorders, escalating
crime rates, urban racial rebellions, dissatisfaction with the
treatment model, and emerging politics of crime that prompted
calls for a return to classical criminal law and paved the way for
get-tough policies.19
Structural, economic, and racial demographic changes in
American cities during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to escalating black youth homicide rates at the end of the 1980s and
provided the context within which states adopted get-tough policies. 20 The Great Migration increased the concentration of impoverished African Americans consigned to inner-city ghettoes.
Federal housing, highway, and mortgage policies combined with
bank redlining, real estate block-busting, and sales practices to
create increasingly poor minority urban cores surrounded by
16. 421 U.S. 519, 528–33, 541 (1975). See infra notes 134, 381 and accompanying text.
17. 403 U.S. 528, 545–51 (1971). See infra notes 46, 135, 305–06, 308–09,
316, 338 and accompanying text. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based
on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1143–69 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Constitutional
Tension].
18. See Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1145.
19. Youth crime increased in the 1960s as baby-boomer children reached
adolescence. The increased urbanization of blacks led to higher crime rates in
minority areas. Race riots rocked many American cities between 1964 and 1968.
These broader structural and demographic changes provided the backdrop for
the Warren Court’s civil rights decisions, criminal procedure rulings, and juvenile court opinions. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); Barry
C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race, Politics].
20. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1.
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predominantly white affluent suburbs. Beginning in the early
1970s, the globalization of manufacturing and technological innovations eliminated many jobs of less-skilled workers and produced a bifurcation of economic opportunities based on education
and technical skills. The economic changes adversely affected
blacks more deeply than other groups because of their more recent entry into the manufacturing economy, their vulnerability
in the social stratification system, their lower educational attainments, and their spatial isolation from sectors of job
growth. 21 By the 1980s, deindustrialization and white flight left
an impoverished black underclass trapped in urban ghettos.22
The introduction of crack cocaine and proliferation of guns
sparked turf wars over control of drug markets.23 Black youth
homicide rates sharply escalated and gun violence provided political impetus to transform juvenile-justice policies. 24
Beginning in the 1960s, the rise in youth crime and urban
racial disorders evoked fear of crime in the streets. National Republican politicians decried a crisis of law and order, pursued a
southern strategy to appeal to white southern voters’ racial antipathy and resistance to school integration, and engineered a
conservative backlash to foster a political realignment around
race and public-policy issues.25 Political divisions about race and
social policy enabled conservative politicians to advocate punitive crime and welfare policies for electoral advantage. In the
1980s and 1990s, those policies produced longer sentences and
mass incarceration for adult offenders and punitive changes in
juvenile courts’ transfer and sentencing laws.
Contemporary juvenile justice policies reflect the harsh legacy of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ get-tough policies—extensive pre-

21. Feld, Race, Politics, supra note 19. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF
JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1.
22. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING
BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY (2009) [hereinafter WILSON, MORE THAN
JUST RACE]; WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED].
23. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 26–29 (1995). See generally FELD, BAD KIDS,
supra note 1; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998).
24. Blumstein, supra note 23, at 32–36. See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; ZIMRING, supra note 23.
25. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 7–14 (1992). See generally KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).

2017]

COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY

479

trial detention, punitive delinquency sanctions, increased transfer to criminal courts, and severe sentences as adults—all of
which are rife with racial disparities. Although serious youth
crime and violence peaked around 1993 and has dropped precipitously over the subsequent two decades, those harsh laws remain on the books in most states. 26 The recent Supreme Court
trilogy of Eighth Amendment decisions—Roper, Graham, and
Miller—reaffirmed that children are different, relied on developmental psychology and neuroscience research to support its conclusions about youths’ diminished criminal responsibility, and
limited the most draconian sentences. However, they provided
affected youths with limited relief and gave state courts and legislatures minimal guidance to implement their jurisprudence of
youth.
I divide this Article into two parts: delinquents in juvenile
courts and youths tried in criminal courts. I analyze the contexts
within which questions of adolescents’ competence and culpability arise. Part I.A examines substantive decisions that affect delinquents’ custody status: (1) pretrial detention; and (2) delinquency sanctions—and the increased punitiveness and racial
disparities associated with each decision. Part I.B examines procedural issues associated with delinquency adjudications: (1)
youths’ ability to exercise Miranda rights; (2) competence to
stand trial; (3) waivers of counsel; and (4) right to a jury trial.
Juvenile courts’ increased punitiveness, procedural deficiencies,
and assembly-line process compound youths’ developmental limitations, heighten risks of excessive and discriminatory interventions, and raise the specter of wrongful convictions. Part II examines transfer of youths to criminal court, and their sentencing
as adults. Part II.A describes: (1) state laws’ shift from a focus
on offenders to offenses; (2) the increased role of prosecutors to
make adulthood determinations; (3) transfer laws’ failure to
achieve their legislative intent; and (4) their racially disparate
impacts. Part II.B examines Supreme Court decisions—Roper,
Graham, and Miller—that: (1) somewhat mitigated the harshest
sentencing policies; (2) reaffirmed that children are different;
and (3) used developmental psychology and neuroscience research to bolster its conclusions about youths’ diminished responsibility. The Article concludes with proposals for substantive and procedural reforms to address juvenile and criminal
courts’ failure to provide developmentally appropriate justice for
children.
26. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1.
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I. DELINQUENTS IN JUVENILE COURT: CUSTODY,
RACIAL DISPARITY, AND COMPETENCE
Social welfare and social control operate in fundamental
tension. How do we balance young offenders’ best interests with
punishment for their offenses? How do we safeguard children
and protect communities? The Progressives’ interventionist juvenile court asserted a social welfare mission in which children’s
and society’s interests were congruent, but get-tough politicians
subordinated welfare to crime control. This imbalance inevitably
occurs because states define delinquency jurisdiction based on
criminal behavior rather than children’s welfare needs, which
diverts attention from the criminogenic conditions in which
many youths live.
By the 1990s, punitive policies supplanted juvenile courts’
earlier emphases on offenders’ rehabilitation and had a disproportionate impact on children of color. This section focuses on
juvenile court decisions that reflect judgments about delinquents’ culpability and affect their custody status: (1) pretrial
detention—the delinquency equivalent of jail; and (2) changes in
delinquency sanctions that emphasized offense-based punishment rather than offender rehabilitation.
A. PRETRIAL AND POST-CONVICTION CUSTODY STATUS
Questions about effectiveness of rehabilitation emerged in
the 1960s, eroded juvenile courts’ interventionist rationale, and
evoked a sense of failure among practitioners and the public. In
1974, Robert Martinson’s essay, What Works?, concluded that
“[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts
that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on
recidivism.” 27 “Nothing works” became the conventional wisdom
for several decades thereafter, undercut efforts to treat offenders, and reinforced conservatives’ distrust of government efforts
to reduce crime or ameliorate social problems.
Violence and homicide in the late 1980s and early 1990s enabled conservative politicians to promote a stereotype of dangerous superpredators—cold-eyed young killers suffering from
moral poverty—rather than traditional images of disadvantaged
youths who needed help. Based on erroneous demographic pro-

27. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974).
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jections, they predicted a bloodbath of youth crime, even as juvenile violence declined precipitously. 28 Relying on those flawed
predictions, legislators preemptively enacted laws that emphasized suppression of crime—punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation—rather than efforts to rehabilitate children. Juvenile
justice shifted from a welfare to a penal orientation and assumed
responsibility to manage and control delinquents rather than to
treat them. Beginning in the 1970s, just deserts and retribution
displaced rehabilitation as rationales for adult and juvenile sentencing policy. Judges focused primarily on offenders’ present offense and criminal history.
1. Preventive Detention of Delinquents

Conservatives claimed that juvenile courts’ lenient sanctions failed to protect the public and emphasized punishment.
Detention laws give judges broad discretion to confine youths
prior to trial. Judges overuse and abuse detention facilities and
disproportionally detain children of color. Reform efforts can reduce unnecessary and inappropriate use of pretrial confinement.
Pretrial detention involves a youth’s interim custody status
pending trial. 29 In 1984, the Supreme Court in Schall v. Martin
upheld a statute that authorized preventive detention if a judge
found there was a “serious risk” that the child “may . . . commit
an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a
crime.” 30 The law did not specify the type of present offense, the
likelihood or seriousness of any future crime, burden of proof,
criteria, or evidence a judge should consider to make the prediction. Despite these flaws, Schall held that preventive detention
“serves a legitimate state objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pre-trial detainees” satisfy constitutional requirements.31
Social scientists question Schall’s confidence in judges’ clinical prognostication abilities. Research comparing statisticalversus-clinical prediction strongly supports the superiority of ac28. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence: A Cautionary Tale, 42 CRIME & JUST. 265 (2013).
29. BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 441–43 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS];
Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 191–209 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice].
30. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255 (1984).
31. Id. at 256–57.
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tuarial risk-assessment instruments over professional judgments.32 The fallibility of prediction is compounded because
judges at an initial appearance often lack the types of information—psychometric tests, professional evaluations, and social
histories—on which clinicians would rely.
States hold about twenty percent of youths referred to juvenile courts in pretrial detention facilities—between one-quarter
and one-third of a million juveniles annually. 33 In 2011, judges
detained a larger proportion of youths arrested for person offenses (25.4%) than for property crimes (16.5%), but because police arrested so many more youths for property crimes, they confined roughly equal numbers.34 Rates of detention rose and
peaked between 1998 and 2007, even as the absolute numbers of
youths referred to juvenile courts declined.35 Courts detained
older youths at higher rates than younger juveniles, proportionally more boys than girls, and more children of color than white
youths. 36
Inadequate and dangerous conditions have characterized
detention facilities for decades. Get Tough Era policies exacerbated overcrowding as states detained more youths to impose
short-term punishment or to house those awaiting postadjudica-

32. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has long disclaimed psychiatrists’ competence to predict future dangerousness because they tend to not
use information reliably, to disregard base rate variability, to consider factors
that are not predictive, and to assign inappropriate weights to relevant factors.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899–902 (1983) (discussing APA misgivings
regarding expert testimony, but nonetheless declining to bar psychiatric expert
testimony with respect to future dangerousness); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note
1, at 140–45.
33. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 168–70 (2006); Melissa Sickmund et al., Easy
Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2014, OJJDP, https://www.ojjdp.gov/
ojstatbb/ezajcs (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF
JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1.
34. Sickmund et al., supra note 33 (reporting that 80,472 youths were detained in connection with 316,602 person crimes, and 73,474 youths were detained in connection with 444,070 property crimes in 2011).
35. Id. (reporting that detention numbers began to decline after their peak
in 2007, a year in which 349,274 juveniles were detained).
36. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33, at 169–70; Sickmund et al., supra
note 33 (reporting that between 2005 and 2012, youths under the age of twelve
were detained in 7.3% of cases, while seventeen-year-olds were detained in
23.5% of cases; males were detained in 23.1% of cases, while females were detained 16.3% of the time; whites were detained at a lower rate than any other
reported race, at 17.1%, compared to 24.5% for black youths and 23.3% of Hispanic youths).
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tion placement. Conditions of confinement studies report inadequate physical and mental health care, poor education, lack of
treatment services, and excessive use of solitary confinement
and physical restraints.37 Pretrial detention disrupts youths’
lives, weakens ties to family, school, and work, stigmatizes them,
and impairs legal defenses. Judges convict and institutionalize
detained youths more often than similar youths released pending trial. 38
There are substantial racial disparities in rates of detention.
States detain black youths more often than similarly situated
white offenders. 39 Detention rates for drug crimes exacerbated
racial disparities. Between 1988 and 1991—the peak of the crack
cocaine panic and the Get Tough Era—judges detained about
half of all black youths charged with drug offenses, a rate twice
37. See DALE G. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 7 (1994) (finding “substantial deficiencies” in detention facilities in areas including living space, security, controlling suicidal behavior, and healthcare).
38. William H. Barton, Detention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 636, 645, 648 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop
eds., 2012) (finding that detention “may foster further delinquency rather than
suppress it,” and that youths are “more likely to receive formal and punitive
treatment by the juvenile justice system simply as a result of having been detained”).
39. Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice
Processing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 31–32 (Darnell Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) [hereinafter OUR CHILDREN, THEIR
CHILDREN]; Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Minority Youths and Juvenile Justice:
Disproportionate Minority Contact After Nearly 20 Years of Reform Efforts, 5
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 71, 73 (2007); Alex R. Piquero, Disproportionate
Minority Contact, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 59, 62 (2008) (reporting racial disparity at
“each decision point” in the juvenile justice system, from arrest to detention to
post-adjudication placement). Between 1985 and 2014, juvenile court judges detained about one-fifth of all youths referred to them. Sickmund et al., supra note
33 (reporting 21.1% detention rate among all juvenile defendants between 1985
and 2011). During that period, judges on average detained 18% of white youths
compared to 24.5% of black youths. Id. Judges detain youths charged with person offenses at higher rates than youths charged with other crimes. Id. (finding
that 26.4% of youths charged for person crimes are detained, while only 16.8%
and 16.9% of youths charged with property and drug crimes, respectively, are
subject to detention). On average, judges detained 23.1% of white youths
charged with person offenses compared with 28.3% of black youths. Id. The racial disparities for drug crimes are especially disturbing because, since the
1970s, self-report research consistently reports that black youths use and sell
drugs at lower rates than do white youths. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 50 (2014) (finding higher drug use among whites than blacks
in both high school and adult self-report surveys).
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that of white youths. 40 While race affects detention decisions, detention adversely affects youths’ subsequent case processing and
compounds disparities at disposition.41
a. Reform Efforts

In the late 1980s, the Annie E. Casey Foundation launched
the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) which
aimed to reduce use of detention, develop alternatives to institutions, reduce overcrowding, improve conditions of confinement,
and lessen racial disparities.42 JDAI reforms enlist justice system stakeholders to develop consensus rationale for detention,
to adopt objective intake and risk assessment criteria, to use alternatives to secure detention—home detention, electronic monitoring, after school or day reporting centers—and to expedite
cases to reduce pretrial confinement. 43 Stakeholders develop criteria to determine which youths to detain based on present offense, prior record, and other factors. Although not all efforts

40. Sickmund et al., supra note 33 (reporting 9600 detentions out of 49,200
total white youths processed for drug crimes in 1988 (19.5%), and 15,500 detentions out of 31,200 black youths processed for drug crimes in the same year
(49.7%)). In 1989, 9900 of the 45,300 white youths processed for drug crimes
were detained (21.9%), while 16,900 of the 33,600 black youths processed for
drug crimes were detained (50.3%). Id. This trend continued through 1990,
when 48% of black youths processed for drug offenses were detained, compared
to 19.7% detention rate among white youth processed for drug offenses. Id.
41. Michael J. Leiber, Race, Pre- and Post-detention, and Juvenile Justice
Decision Making, 59 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 396, 399 (2013) (“Race has . . . indirect effects on decision making through detention . . . [B]eing detained
strongly predicts more severe treatment at judicial disposition.”); Nancy Rodriguez, The Cumulative Effect of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Court Outcomes
and Why Pre-Adjudication Detention Matters, 47 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 391,
391 (2010) (reporting that youths who are detained preadjudication are more
likely to have a petition filed, less likely to have a petition dismissed, and more
likely to be removed from the home at disposition).
42. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
http://www.aecf.org/work/juvenile-justice/jdai (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (explaining the project’s mission to “reduce reliance on local confinement of courtinvolved youth”).
43. See id. (outlining strategies including implementation of “new or expanded alternatives to detention programs” and combatting racial disparities
in youth detention through data analysis and policy reform). See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 5 (outlining the advantages of community
service over “unduly harsh interventions” in reducing the likelihood of re-offense, and discussing specific procedural and assessment reforms necessary to
improving the juvenile system); Barton, supra note 38, at 660–68 (discussing
the systematic improvements in confinement conditions and successful reform
of youth detention policies achieved by JDAI).
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have been equally successful, many sites have reduced the numbers of youths detained with no increases in crime or failures to
appear. 44 JDAI efforts to reduce racial disparities among detained youths have been less successful. 45
b. Policy Recommendations

Juvenile court judges, in collaboration with other stakeholders and social scientists, should develop validated risk-assessment instruments to better identify youths who pose a high risk
of offending. Statutes should presume release of all nonfelony
offenders and place a heavy burden (clear and convincing evidence) on the state to prove that a youth needs secure detention
and that nonsecure alternatives—house arrest, electronic monitoring, shelter-care, and day-reporting—have been exhausted or
would fail. Other than youths who pose a risk of flight or who
have previously absconded from an institution, states should reserve detention for youths charged with serious crimes—felonies, violence, or firearms—for whom, if convicted, commitment
to a secure facility would likely result. States should bolster detention hearing procedures with a non-waivable right to counsel
and an opportunity to meet with defense counsel prior to the
hearing.
2. Punitive Delinquency Dispositions
Supreme Court decisions identify factors distinguishing
punishment from treatment: (1) legislative purpose clauses; (2)
indeterminate or determinate sentencing laws; (3) judges’ sentencing practices; (4) institutional conditions of confinement;
and (5) intervention outcomes.46 In the 1980s and 1990s, law-

44. Barton, supra note 38, at 666.
45. William H. Feyerherm, Detention Reform and Overrepresentation: A
Successful Synergy, 4 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 44 (2000).
46. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371–74 (1986) (analyzing the differences
in conditions and procedures applied to inmates held under criminal sentences,
versus the conditions and procedures applied to persons held for sex offender
treatment, and finding the State act in question was non-punitive based on
these differences); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540, 550 (1971)
(pointing to “various diagnostic and rehabilitative services” in the juvenile system as evidence that the intent of the system is to provide treatment rather
than punishment, and rejecting arguments that the juvenile system is punitive
based on procedural similarities between juvenile court and criminal proceedings); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (identifying
“tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act . . . is penal or regula-
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makers repudiated offender-based treatment, shifted delinquency sanctions toward offense-based punishments, and fostered a punitive convergence between juvenile and criminal
courts’ sentencing policies. 47
States repeatedly amended their juvenile codes’ purpose
clauses to endorse punishment. 48 The revisions focused on accountability, responsibility, punishment, and public safety rather than, or in addition to, a child’s welfare or best interests. 49

tory in character ” including “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment,”
whether it requires scienter, and whether it promotes “the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence,” among other factors); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
PURPOSE 2–3 (1981); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 251–83; Allen, supra note
5, at 25–27; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822 (1988)
(highlighting the shift in the juvenile system “from treatment to punishment”
and the “procedural criminalization of the juvenile court”) [hereinafter Feld,
Punishment, Treatment]; Martin R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice:
A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 791–92 (1982); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a
Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice] (discussing the original conception of the juvenile system as a
“therapeutic tradition” designed to “cure undesirable or unhealthy states of being . . . treating [children] for what they are rather than punishing them for
what they have done” and outlining the disjunction between this conceptual
ideal and the reality of juvenile court in practice).
47. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 46, at 850–57 (discussing the
shift to determinate sentencing, legislative guidelines emphasizing uniformity,
and proportionality over rehabilitation as the predominant sentencing justification in juvenile court); Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 22–
25 (discussing the emergence of punishment rather than the original rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system).
48. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 11 (1996) (noting evolution from “traditional emphasis on . . . future welfare of the juvenile” to punishment, incapacitation, public safety, and accountability); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal
Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 222–23
(1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence] (“[M]ore than one-quarter
of the states have revisited their juvenile codes’ statement of legislative purpose,
deemphasized rehabilitation and the child’s best interest, and asserted the importance of . . . punishment.”); See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1.
49. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 31–32 (noting that the
1980s saw the advent of a “harsher attitude toward juvenile crime,” leading to
policy reform which lasted through the 1990s as lawmakers “reformed juvenile
crime policy to facilitate the adult prosecution and punishment of young offenders”); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 46, at 833–47 (contrasting purposes of treatment and punishment in juvenile systems and noting states’ movement to include concepts of public safety and punishment in legislative purpose
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Accountability became synonymous with retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, and state courts affirmed punishment
as a legitimate element of juvenile courts’ treatment regimes. 50
Originally, juvenile courts viewed delinquency as a symptom of a child’s needs and imposed indeterminate nonproportional dispositions. The shift from an interventionist to a criminalized court culminates a trend Gault set in motion by
providing modest procedural safeguards that legitimated
harsher sanctions.51 In subsequent decades, states amended delinquency sentencing laws to emphasize individual responsibility and justice-system accountability, and adopted determinate
or mandatory minimum sentences. 52 The National Research
Council concluded that:
State legislative changes in recent years have moved the court away
from its rehabilitative goals and toward punishment and accountability. Laws have made some dispositions offense-based rather than of-

statements); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 48 at 222–23; Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 22–25 (discussing concepts of
just deserts, accountability, and offense-oriented sentencing replacing rehabilitative aims in the juvenile system).
50. In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983) (discussing the juvenile court’s original conception of a “child-centered” institution, and praising the
court’s evolution to a harsher ethic, stating that the early court lacked the “moralizing and socializing influence associated with the operation of criminal
courts”); State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979) (finding that the state
legislature may have rationally determined that “accountability for criminal behavior . . . does as much to rehabilitate, correct, and direct an errant youth as
does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the particular characteristics of the
individual juvenile” in enacting punitive legislation); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra
note 1, at 252–53; ASHLEY NELLIS, A RETURN TO JUSTICE: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO JUVENILES IN THE SYSTEM 47–48 (2016); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 46, at 844–47 (explaining that punishment came to be viewed
as an “acceptable purpose” of juvenile court proceedings and cataloging judicial
decisions highlighting accountability and punishment as legislative purposes of
the juvenile justice system).
51. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 57–68 (outlining Supreme Court decisions regarding process in juvenile court, ultimately
leading to a procedural and substantive convergence with criminal courts, and
noting that the provision of “meager ” procedural safeguards “legitimated the
escalation of penalties” imposed by juvenile courts); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 15–17 (1978).
52. TORBET ET AL., supra note 48, at 11–16 (discussing the juvenile court’s
emphasis on punishment and accountability); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 46, at 850–79 (addressing determinate sentencing in juvenile court,
and providing state-specific analysis of legislative changes to juvenile codes);
Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 48, at 220–28 (discussing the effects of reframing the juvenile system’s purpose in terms of punishment and
accountability and states’ adoption of determinate and mandatory sentences).
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fender-based. Offense-based sanctions are to be proportional to the offense and have retribution or deterrence as their goals. Strategies for
imposing offense-based sentences in juvenile court include blended
sentences, mandatory minimum sentences, and extended jurisdiction. 53

Several factors influence juvenile court judges’ sentencing
decisions. States define juvenile courts’ delinquency jurisdiction
based on criminal violations. The same factors that influence
criminal court judges’ sentences—present offense and prior record—influence juvenile court judges’ sentences as well. 54 Another consistent finding is that juveniles’ race affects the severity of dispositions.55 Several factors account for racial
disparities: differences in rates of offending, differential selection, and juvenile courts’ context—the interaction of urban locale
with minority residency. 56 As a result, juvenile courts’ punitive
sanctions fall disproportionately heavily on African American
youths.
Delinquency case processing entails a succession of decisions by police, court personnel, prosecutors, and judges. Compounding effects of disparities produce larger cumulative differences between white youths and children of color. 57 Although the
greatest disparities occur at earlier less visible stages of the process, differences compound, prior records accumulate, and blacks
and other racial minorities comprise the largest plurality of
youth in institutions.
53. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 210
(Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001).
54. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 264–67 (discussing the sentencing of
juveniles, particularly in the context of racial disparities in sentencing); SCOTT
& STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 229–31 (exploring sentencing factors in juvenile
courts including a youth’s prior criminal record).
55. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 267–72 (citing studies finding that
juvenile courts detain black youths at higher rates than white youths, even
when controlling for relevant variables); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
53, at 228 (noting “major disparities” in the involvement of minority and white
youth in the juvenile justice system). See generally Donna Bishop & Michael
Leiber, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Delinquency and Justice System Responses, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 445.
56. See Bishop & Leiber, supra note 55, at 453–61.
57. In 2005, Black youths comprised about 16.6% of the population aged
10–17, 31.4% of juvenile arrests, 33.2% of delinquency referrals, 38.1% of juveniles detained, 40% of youths charged, and 40% of youths placed out of home.
Bishop and Leiber, supra note 55, at 446–53. See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 231–34 (providing similar statistics for 1997); EILEEN
POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7–10 (2000) (providing statistics for 1997–1999).
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Justice system decisions amplify racial differences in processing youths. At each stage of the process, arrest, court referral, detention, petition, and sentencing decisions amplify disparities. 58 Police stop and arrest youths of color more frequently
than white youths. 59 Probation officers attribute white youths’
offenses to external circumstances and black youths’ crimes to
internal fault or character failings, which affects their referral,
detention, and sentencing recommendations.60
Judges’ focus on present offense and prior records further
contribute to racial differences. Black youths commit violent
crimes at higher rates than white juveniles, which account for
some disparities. 61 By contrast, police arrest black youths at
58. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 254–57; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 77. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE
COURT, supra note 1, at 139; Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21
CRIME & JUST. 311, 363–64 (1997).
59. Factors contributing to heightened risk of arrest include: self-fulfilling
deployment of police in neighborhoods, racial profiling, aggressive stop-andfrisk practices, and youths’ attitude and demeanor during encounters. Bishop
& Leiber, supra note 55, at 461 (explaining that minority youths have more
exposure than white youths to “contexts of risk,” including socioeconomic, geographic, and family conditions). See generally Bishop, supra note 39.
60. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 257 (reporting that
black adolescents are “being channeled to correctional facilities” while their
“equally aggressive white counterparts are directed toward psychiatric treatment facilities”). See generally George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juveniles Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as
Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554 (1998).
61. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 214–21; Piquero, supra note
39, at 64. The higher rates of violent offending by black youth reflect their
greater exposure to risk factors associated with criminal involvement, many of
which are corollaries of living in dire poverty. See Bryanna Hahn Fox et al.,
Serious, Chronic, and Violent Offenders, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK
553, 559–60 (Wesley T. Church II et al. eds., 2014); J. David Hawkins et al., A
Review of Predictors of Youth Violence, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS 106, 140–46 (Rolf
Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 1998). Concentrated poverty, limited employment opportunities, broken or unstable families, poor parental supervision,
harsh discipline, abuse or maltreatment, failing schools, gang-infested neighborhoods, and community disorder contribute to higher rates of crime and violence in segregated urban areas. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 39, at 96–97; MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN
DILEMMA 30 (2011); WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE, supra note 22, at 143–55
(2009) (advocating for a framework for understanding the formation and
maintenance of racial inequality that integrates both cultural and structural
forces); WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 22 (discussing how increasing rates of social dislocation are the product of a complex web of factors).
Some inner-city black youths may be socialized in a code of the street that em-
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higher rates for drug crimes, although white youths use drugs
more often.62
Juvenile courts’ context also contribute to disparities. Urban
courts are more formal and sentence all delinquents more severely than do suburban or rural courts.63 They have greater access to detention facilities, detain more minority youths, and
sentence all detained youths more severely.64 Because more minority youths live in cities, judges detain them at higher rates,
and sentence them in more formal, punitive courts. 65
Punitive sentencing laws have exacerbated racial disparities in confinement. Over the past quarter-century, the proportion of white youths removed from home declined by about ten
percent, while that of black youths increased by ten percent. 66 In
1985, states removed 105,830 delinquents from their homes and
placed them in residential facilities. 67 The number of youths who
received out-of-home placements increased steadily during the
phasizes masculinity, risk taking, autonomy, and violent responses to challenges or disrespect. See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, THE CODE OF THE
STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999)
(explaining that street culture has evolved a “code of the street” as a set of informal rules which govern interpersonal public behavior, particularly violence);
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 371,
382 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2000). The presence of gangs can
lead to intragang violence over status and intergang violence to settle territorial
disputes or perceived disrespect. Id. at 377–78.
62. Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offending, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra note 39, at 83, 95–100; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 219–20.
63. BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
THE JUVENILE COURTS 158–62 (1993) [hereinafter FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN]; Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156,
185–90 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Justice by Geography].
64. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1337–39 (1989) [hereinafter Feld, Right to Counsel]; Rodriguez, supra note 41 (finding that minority juveniles were treated more severely
in juvenile court outcomes than their white counterparts).
65. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 271–72; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra
note 33; Timothy M. Bray et al., Justice by Geography: Racial Disparity and
Juvenile Courts, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN, supra note 39, at 270,
292–94 (finding that a court’s rural or urban location was a significant predictor
of placement decisions in juvenile cases).
66. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 141; see generally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system changed
focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 1990s).
67. See sources cited supra note 66.
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1990s and peaked at 168,395 delinquents in 1997—a 59% increase that reflects Get Tough Era changes and judicial sensitivity to the punitive ethos. Since the peak in the late 1990s, the
number of youth removed from home has declined dramatically.68 Although we do not know why residential placements
have decreased, fiscal considerations may have driven confinement decisions.
Despite the recent decline, the racial composition of youths
in confinement changed substantially. In 1985, judges removed
68.5% of non-Hispanic and Hispanic white youths, 28.5% of
black youths and 2.9% of youths of other races from their
homes. 69 By 2012, the proportion of white youths removed from
home declined to 57.8% of all youths—a 10.7% decrease—while
the proportion of black youths increased to 39.3%—an offsetting
10.8% increase.70 Despite dramatic overall reduction of youths
in confinement, the racial composition of institutionalized inmates became ever darker. During the decade, the proportion of
white inmates declined from 37.2% to 33.8% of all residents, the
proportion of black inmates hovered around 40%, and that of
other youths of color increased.71
Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act (JJDPA) in 1988 to require states receiving federal juvenile-justice funds to examine sources of minority
over-representation in detention and institutions. 72 It amended
the JJDPA in 1992 to make reporting disproportionate minority
confinement a core requirement and again in 2002 to require
states to reduce disproportionate minority contact. 73 States responded to the 1988 JJDPA requirement by conducting evaluations and reporting disproportionate overrepresentation of minority youths in institutions.74
68. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 141–42; see
generally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system
changed focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 1990s).
69. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 143; see generally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system changed
focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the 1990s).
70. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 143.
71. Id. at 144; see generally NELLIS, supra note 50 (explaining how the juvenile justice system changed focus from rehabilitation to retribution during the
1990s).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (2000); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
53, at 228–29.
73. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 211–12.
74. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 268; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 1, at 212.
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Minority juveniles receive disproportionately more out-ofhome placements, while white youths receive more probationary
dispositions.75 Judges commit black youths to public institutions
at rates three and four times that of white youths, and send
larger proportions of white youths to private residential treatment programs. Black youths serve longer terms than do white
youths committed for similar offenses.76
Researchers have evaluated programs in community and
residential settings to determine what works, how well, and at
what costs. The diversity of facilities and programs, the variability of populations they serve, and the lack of control groups make
it difficult to attribute positive outcomes to intervention or to
sample selection bias of youths committed to them. 77 Correctional meta-analyses combine independent studies to measure
effectiveness of different strategies to reduce recidivism or other
outcomes. Evaluations have compared generic strategies (counseling, behavior modification, and group therapy), more sophisticated interventions and replications of brand-name programs
(Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Multisystemic Therapy
(MST)), and cost-benefit appraisals of different treatments. 78
Substantial literature exists on effectiveness of probation and
other forms of noninstitutional treatment.79 Community-based
programs are more likely to be run by private (usually nonprofit) service providers, to be smaller and less overcrowded, and
to offer more treatment services than do publicly run institutions. 80
Delbert Elliot developed the Blueprints for Prevention program that certifies programs as proven or promising. Proven pro-

75. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 57, at 2.
76. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 221–22; POE-YAMAGATA &
JONES, supra note 57, at 18–21.
77. Peter W. Greenwood & Susan Turner, Probation and Other Noninstitutional Treatment: The Evidence Is In, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 723, 725–26.
78. Id. at 726–28; Doris Layton MacKenzie & Rachel Freeland, Examining
the Effectiveness of Juvenile Residential Programs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 771, 790.
79. See, e.g., Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77; MacKenzie & Freeland,
supra note 78.
80. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 725; see PETER GREENWOOD,
CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY 183–
94 (2005) [hereinafter GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES] (explaining that providing programmatic support to the juvenile courts’ high-risk offenders is a critical
part of the government’s approach to providing services for the young).
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grams demonstrate reductions in problem behaviors with rigorous experimental design, continuing effects after youths leave
the program, and successful replication by independent providers. 81 Although some proven programs treat delinquents, most
programs aim to prevent school-aged youths’ involvement with
the juvenile justice system. 82 Mark Lipsey’s ongoing meta-analyses report that treatment strategies such as counseling and
skill-building are more effective than those adopted during the
Get Tough Era that emphasize surveillance, control, and discipline.83 The Campbell Collaboration conducted meta-analyses of
rigorous empirical evaluations of treatment programs for serious
delinquents in secure institutions and concluded that cognitivebehavioral treatment reduced overall and serious recidivism. 84
Cost-benefit studies use meta-analytic methods to evaluate program costs and benefits to the individual and community—recidivism reduction, costs to taxpayers, and losses for potential victims.85 While there is a paucity of high-quality evaluations,
research suggests that prevention programs—preschool enrichment and family-based interventions outside of the juvenile justice system—provide benefits that exceed their costs and improvements in education, employment, income, mental health,
and other outcomes.86
Cumulatively, evaluations conclude that states can handle
most delinquents safely in community settings with cognitivebehavioral models of change.87 The most successful Blueprints
programs—FFT and MST—focus on altering family interac-

81. NELLIS, supra note 50, at 83–86; MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78,
at 790–91.
82. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 728.
83. Mark W. Lipsey, The Primary Factors that Characterize Effective Interventions with Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Overview, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 124, 143–45 (2009).
84. Vicente Garrido & Luz Anyela Morales, Serious (Violent and Chronic)
Juvenile Offenders: A Systematic Review of Treatment Effectiveness in Secure
Corrections, 3 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 1, 26 (2007), https://www
.campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/1029_Rv.2.pdf; MacKenzie &
Freeland, supra note 78, at 793–95.
85. Brandon C. Welsh et al., Promoting Change, Changing Lives: Effective
Prevention and Intervention to Reduce Serious Offending, in FROM JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION 245, 262–68 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012).
86. Id. at 267–70.
87. MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 793–95.
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tions, improving family problem-solving skills, and strengthening parents’ ability to deal with their children’s behaviors.88 But
effective programs require extensive and expensive staff training, for which most state and local agencies are unwilling to pay.
Despite decades of research, “only about 5% of the youths who
could benefit from these improved programs now have the opportunity to do so. Juvenile justice options in many communities
remain mired in the same old tired options of custodial care and
community supervision.” 89
Gault mandated procedural safeguards, in part, because of
conditions in training schools.90 Cases contemporaneous with
Gault described inmates beaten by guards, hog-tied, or becoming
psychotic through prolonged isolation.91 Recent lawsuits challenging institutional conditions reveal gang-conflict, inadequate
education programs, deficient mental health and health care services, suicide, heavy reliance on solitary confinement, and inmates’ sexual abuse and deaths at the hands of staff. 92
Analysts criticize training schools as sterile and unimaginative, as inappropriate venues in which to treat juveniles, as
schools for crime where children learn from more delinquent
peers, and as settings in which staff and residents abuse and
mistreat inmates. 93 During the 1960s and 1970s, investigators
conducted in-depth ethnographic research in correctional facilities.94 Studies in different states reported similar findings—violent environments, minimal treatment or educational programs,
physical abuse by staff and inmates, make-work tasks, extensive
use of solitary confinement, and the like.95 In the ensuing decades, little has changed. States continue to confine half of all
88. NELLIS, supra note 50, at 84; Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at
738–40.
89. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 744.
90. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1967).
91. Barry Krisberg, Juvenile Corrections: An Overview, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 748,
751–52.
92. Id. at 754–57.
93. MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 775.
94. See generally CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION:
THE INSTITUTIONAL PARADOX (1976) (conducting ethno-graphic research on correctional facilities); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) [hereinafter FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE] (examining juvenile inmate subculture as influenced by
organizational structure of correctional institutions).
95. See generally BARTOLLAS ET AL., supra note 94 (reporting on juvenile
victimization in correctional settings); FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE,
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youths in overcrowded facilities, more than three-quarters in
large facilities, and more than one-quarter in institutions with
200 to 1000 inmates. 96
Over the past four decades, juvenile inmates have filed
nearly sixty lawsuits that challenge conditions of confinement,
asserting that they violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment, and deny their Fourteenth
Amendment right to treatment. 97 Eighth Amendment litigation
is proscriptive, defines constitutionally impermissible practices,
and delineates the minimum floor below which institutional conditions may not fall. Judicial opinions from around the country
describe youths housed in dungeon-like facilities, beaten with
paddles, drugged for social control, locked in solitary confinement, housed in overcrowded and dangerous conditions, and
other punitive practices.98 The Fourteenth Amendment litigation is prescriptive and asserts that the denial of criminal procedural protections imposes a substantive right to treatment and
creates a duty to provide beneficial programs.99
Do institutional treatment programs reduce recidivism, enhance psychological well-being, improve educational attainments, provide vocational skills, or boost community readjustment? There are no standard measures of recidivism—rearrest,
reconviction, or recommitment—and most states do not collect
data on programs’ effectiveness or recidivism, which complicates
judges’ ability to distinguish treatment from punishment. 100 Despite these limitations, evaluations of training schools provide
scant evidence of effective treatment. 101 Programs that emphasize deterrence or punishment—institutions and boot camps—

supra note 94 (explaining how organizational features contribute to inmates’
incentive to use violence and provide a conducive environment in which to carry
out violent activities); Krisberg, supra note 91 (describing the history of juvenile
corrections as plagued with abuse, tragedy, and limited positive results).
96. PARENT ET AL., supra note 37, at 7–8; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note
33; MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 774.
97. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 274–77; NELLIS, supra note 50, at
113–15; Krisberg, supra note 91, at 753–54.
98. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 275–76; Krisberg, supra note 91, at
754–55.
99. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 29, at 969–81.
100. Greenwood & Turner, supra note 77, at 743–44; Krisberg, supra note
91, at 761–62.
101. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 279–83; Krisberg, supra note 91, at
762–64.
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may lead to increased criminal activity following release. 102 Correctional boot camps reflect punitive policies and emphasize
physical training, drill, and discipline. Despite their popularity,
they do not reduce recidivism and some studies report increases.103 Evaluations of training schools report that police rearrest half or more juveniles for a new offense within one year of
release.104 More than half of incarcerated youth have not completed the eighth grade and more than two-thirds do not return
to school following release. 105
a. Juvenile Corrections Policy: What Should a Responsible
Legislature Do?
Justice system involvement impedes youths’ transition to
adulthood and aggravates minority youths’ social disadvantage.106 Like the Hippocratic Oath, the first priority of juvenile court intercession should be harm reduction: to avoid or
minimize practices that leave a youth worse off. 107 Adolescence
is a developmentally fraught period of rapid growth and personality change. Most delinquents will outgrow adolescent crimes
without extensive treatment and interventions should be shortterm, community-based, and as minimally disruptive as possible. “The best-known cure for youth crime is growing up. And the
strategic logic of diversion and minimal sanctions is waiting for
maturation to transition a young man from male groups to intimate pairs and from street corners to houses and workplaces.” 108
More than four decades ago, the Massachusetts Department
of Youth Services (DYS) closed its training schools and replaced
them with community-based alternatives—group homes, mental

102. MacKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 794.
103. NELLIS, supra note 50, at 57–58, 84–85; MacKenzie & Freeland, supra
note 78, at 784.
104. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33; Krisberg, supra note 91, at 763;
McKenzie & Freeland, supra note 78, at 729.
105. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 149; NELLIS,
supra note 50, at 65–67.
106. Franklin E. Zimring, Minority Overrepresentation: On Causes and Partial Cures, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 169,
169 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014).
107. Id. at 174.
108. Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics
for Contemporary Reforms, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 216, 228.
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health facilities, and contracts for services for education, counseling, and job training. 109 Evaluations reported that more than
three-quarters of DYS youths were not subsequently incarcerated, juvenile arrest rates decreased, and the proportion of adult
prison inmates who had graduated from juvenile institutions declined. 110 More recently, Missouri has replicated and expanded
on the Massachusetts experiment and used continuous case
management, decentralized residential units, and staff-facilitated positive peer culture to provide a rehabilitative environment. 111 Although proponents claim reduction in recidivism
rates, no rigorous evaluations demonstrate its effectiveness. 112
Other states have adopted deinstitutionalization strategies. The
California Youth Authority has closed five large institutions and
reduced its incarcerated population from about 10,000 juveniles
to around 1600—changes driven in part by fiscal considerations. 113 New York’s Office of Children and Family Services
(OCFS) announced plans to close six youth correctional facilities
after a study found that nearly eighty percent of young people
released from its facilities were rearrested within three years. 114
b. Punishment or Prevention
Delinquency prevention programs provide an alternative to
control or suppression strategies and reflect the adage, a stitch
in time saves nine. Prevention programs intervene with children
and youths before they engage in delinquency. Risk-focused prevention identifies factors that contribute to offending and em-

109. JEROME MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL 177–90 (1991); see generally FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 94 (describing how the
Department of Youth Services in Massachusetts became a highly visible symbol
of a new approach to juvenile corrections by repudiating training schools and
advocating for community-based services).
110. BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., WORKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES (1989); MILLER,
supra note 109, at 218–26.
111. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 416.
112. Id. at 422–24; NELLIS, supra note 50, at 86–87.
113. Krisberg, supra note 91, at 748.
114. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs., New York
Office of Children & Family Services Accelerating Transformation of State Juvenile Justice System (Jan. 11, 2008), https://ocfs.ny.gov/main/documents/press/
NYS_OCFS_PRESS_011108_Accelerating_juvenile_justice_transformation
.pdf.
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ploys programs to ameliorate or counteract them. Some interventions apply to communities and others to individuals, and
their families, at risk of becoming offenders.115
Some prevention strategies identify individual risk factors—low intelligence or delayed school progress—and provide
programs to improve cognitive skills, school readiness, and social
skills.116 The Perry Preschool project—an enhanced Head Start
program for disadvantaged black children—aims to provide intellectual stimulation, improve critical-thinking skills, and enhance later school performance. 117 Cost-benefit analyses and
evaluations report that larger proportions of experimental
youths graduated from high school, received postsecondary education, had better employment records (higher income and paid
taxes), had fewer arrests, and reduced public expenditures for
crime and welfare.118
Other delinquency prevention programs address the families in which at-risk youths live. Family-based risk factors include poor child-rearing techniques, inadequate supervision,
lack of clear norms, and inconsistent or harsh discipline. 119
Home visitation, nurse home visitation, and parent management
training can produce positive outcomes in the lives of children. 120
Family interventions for adjudicated delinquents that operate
outside of the juvenile justice system—MST, FFT, and multidimensional treatment foster care (MTFC)—also produce positive
outcomes.121
David Farrington and Brandon Welsh, in Saving Children
From a Life of Crime, provide a comprehensive review of risk
factors and effective interventions to prevent delinquency. 122
They identify individual-, family-, and community-level factors
and effective programs to ameliorate delinquency. At each level,
115. DAVID P. FARRINGTON & BRANDON C. WELSH, SAVING CHILDREN FROM
LIFE OF CRIME: EARLY RISK FACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 93–97
(2007); GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 5–6; Brandon C.
Welsh, Delinquency Prevention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 395, 395 [hereinafter Welsh, Delinquency Prevention]; GREENWOOD, supra note 80, at 5–6.
116. Welsh, Delinquency Prevention, supra note 115, at 397–98.
117. Id. at 398–99.
118. Id. at 398.
119. Welsh et al., supra note 85, at 248.
120. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 51; Welsh et al., supra
note 85, at 248–51.
121. GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 70–73; Welsh et al.,
supra note 85, at 249–50.
122. FARRINGTON & WELSH, supra note 115, at 395.
A
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they report proven or promising programs to improve youths’
lives and recommend risk-focused evidence-based prevention
programs.123
Peter Greenwood, in Changing Lives: Delinquency Prevention as Crime-Control Policy, provides a comprehensive review
of prevention programs. He focuses on interventions across the
developmental spectrum, from infancy and early childhood
through elementary-school-aged children, and into adolescence.
Some prevention programs have been adequately evaluated and
clearly do not work—for example, Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE). 124 Many prevention programs have no evidentiary support; they either have not been evaluated or used such
flawed design that researchers could draw no conclusions. 125
Greenwood uses cost-benefit analyses to evaluate various delinquency and prevention programs. While cost-benefit analyses
could rationalize delinquency policy and resource-allocation decisions, politicians do not embrace prevention programs because
they lack a punitive component and do not demonstrate immediate impact. 126 While highly visible crimes evoke fear and elicit a
punitive response, delinquency prevention takes longer to realize and has a more diffuse impact. 127 Despite effective programs,
delinquency prevention “holds a small place in the nation’s response to juvenile crime. Delinquency control strategies operated by the juvenile justice system dominate.” 128
3. Conclusion
Progressive reformers created juvenile courts to divert
youths from the criminal justice system and rehabilitate them in
a separate system. Politicians in the Get Tough Era assaulted
the idea that children are different, repudiated the court’s welfare role, and rejected its premise to keep youths out of prisons.
Despite their punitive turn, changes in juvenile justice were less
extreme than the mass incarceration that overtook the adult
criminal justice system.
While juvenile courts served their diversionary function,
lawmakers sharply shifted their interventions from rehabilitation toward offense-based punitive policies. During the last third
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES, supra note 80, at 90–96.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
Welsh, Delinquency Prevention, supra note 115, at 409.
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of the twentieth century, lawmakers abandoned even nominal
commitment to treatment in favor of punishment. They changed
juvenile codes’ purpose from care and treatment to accountability and punishment. They amended delinquency sentencing statutes to define length and location of confinement based on offense. In practice, judges focused primarily on present offense
and prior record when making dispositions. All of these punitive
changes had a disproportionate impact on black youths and
other children of color. Although most delinquents received probation, between 1987 and 1997, institutional confinement rose
by fifty-four percent. Training schools more closely resembled
prisons than clinics and seldom improved delinquents’ life trajectories. Training schools are the least effective way to respond
to youths’ needs. Meta-analyses and other evaluations identify
effective programs and most of them are not administered by juvenile justice personnel.
I emphasize juvenile courts’ explicitly punitive turn because
it implicates their procedural safeguards. The Court in McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania denied delinquents a right to a jury and In re
Gault granted only watered-down safeguards because it assumed that delinquents received treatment. But as juvenile
courts punish youths, their justification for reduced safeguards
evaporates. Finally, the turn toward punishment falls most
heavily on black youths. At every critical decision, black youths
receive more punitive sanctions than white youths. Differences
in rates of violence by race contribute to some disparity in justice
administration. But many black youths experience very different
childhoods than do most white youths. 129 Public policies and private decisions created segregated urban areas and consigned
children of color to live in concentrated poverty with criminogenic consequences. Race affects decision-makers’ responses to
children of color: the way they see them, evaluate them, and dispose of them. It is not coincidental that the turn from welfare to
punishment and from rehabilitation to retribution occurred as
African Americans gained civil rights and the United States

129. See generally FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at
87–88 (examining the causes of overrepresentation of minority youths in the
juvenile justice system); ROBERT PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN
CRISIS (2015) (describing the growing inequality gap between children of high
school and college educated parents in their ability to achieve the American
Dream).
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briefly flirted with integration and inclusionary, rather than exclusionary, racial policies. 130
B. JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURES: ADOLESCENTS’ COMPETENCE
TO EXERCISE RIGHTS
Progressive reformers created juvenile courts to divert children from criminal courts and to treat rather than punish them.
Envisioned as a welfare agency, juvenile courts rejected criminal
procedural safeguards and dispensed with formalities like lawyers, juries, and rules of evidence. 131 In 1967, In re Gault began
to transform the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into
a more formal legal institution. 132 The Court emphasized juvenile courts’ criminal elements—youths charged with crimes facing institutional confinement, stigma of delinquency labels and
records, judicial arbitrariness, and high rates of recidivism—and
required proof of guilt using fair procedures. Although Gault did
not adopt adult criminal procedural protections, it precipitated
an operational convergence between juvenile and criminal
courts. Subsequent decisions further emphasized delinquency
proceedings’ criminal character. In re Winship required states to
prove delinquency by the criminal standard—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—rather than by the lower civil standard of
proof.133 Breed v. Jones posited a functional equivalency between
juvenile and criminal trials and applied the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause to delinquency prosecutions. 134 However, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania posited a benevolent juvenile
court, denied delinquents a constitutional right to a jury trial,
and rejected procedural parity between delinquency and criminal proceedings.135 Punitive changes have eroded McKeiver’s rationale and the absence of a jury adversely affects accurate factfinding, the presence and performance of counsel, and increases
the likelihood of wrongful convictions.136

130. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 79; FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE
COURT, supra note 1, at 155.
131. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1 at 80; see generally TANENHAUS, supra
note 3 (explaining how child advocates built up a separate court system for juveniles).
132. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 141–42; FELD,
BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 80–81; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 89.
133. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
134. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
135. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
136. Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground

502

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:473

Juvenile courts handle about half the youths referred to
them informally without filing a formal petition or proceeding to
trial.137 Court intake workers or prosecutors perform a triage
function and conduct a rapid assessment to determine whether
a youth’s crime or welfare requires juvenile court attention or
can be discharged or referred to others for care. Diversion minimizes formal adjudication and provides supervision or services
in the community. Proponents of diversion contend that it is an
efficient gatekeeping mechanism, avoids labeling minor offenders, and provides flexible access to community resources that referral after a formal process might delay. 138 Most youths desist
after one or two contacts and diversion conserves judicial resources for those youths who distinguish themselves by recidivism.139
Critics of diversion contend that it widens the net of social
control and exposes to informal supervision youths that juvenile
courts otherwise might have ignored. 140 Probation officers or
prosecutors who do preliminary screening of cases make low-visibility decisions which are not subject to judicial or appellate review. 141 Many states do not use formal screening or assessment
tools and discretion at intake constitutes the most significant
source of racial disparities in case processing. 142 Although the
criteria and administration of diversion raise many significant
policy concerns, cases handled informally do not raise the procedural issues of formal adjudication.
During the Get Tough Era, juvenile courts increasingly punished delinquents and increased their need for protection from
the state. Gault made delinquency hearings more formal, complex, and legalistic, and required youths to participate in making
for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 NORTHERN KY. L. REV. 257, 260 (2007); Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1222–24. See generally Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice, supra note 46 (arguing that “the continued homage to
McKeiver in an era of punitive juvenile justice is the misguided result of judicial
inattention to the distinction between punitive and rehabilitative dispositions”).
137. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33; Daniel P. Mears, The Front End
of the Juvenile Court: Intake and Informal Versus Formal Processing, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 55,
at 573, 586.
138. Mears, supra note 137, at 585.
139. Id. at 594.
140. Id. at 596.
141. Id. at 596–97.
142. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 6; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 221; Bishop, supra note 39, at 39–40; Mears, supra note
137, at 587.
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difficult decisions. Developmental psychologists question
whether younger juveniles possess competence to stand trial and
whether adolescents have the ability to exercise Miranda rights
or to waive counsel. 143 Despite clear developmental differences
between youths and adults in understanding, maturity of judgment, and competence, the Court and most states do not provide
either additional safeguards to protect them from their immaturity or procedural parity with criminal defendants, thus increasing the likelihood of excessive interventions and erroneous outcomes.
This section examines juvenile court practices and youths’
competence to exercise procedural rights: Miranda rights, competence to stand trial, access to counsel, and jury trial. Subsection 1 analyzes juveniles’ ability to exercise Miranda rights. It
contrasts states’ use of adult legal standards with psychological
research that describes juveniles’ questionable competence,
heightened vulnerability during interrogation, and increased
likelihood to make false confessions. Subsection 2 reviews legal
standards and developmental research on adolescents’ competence to stand trial. Subsection 3 examines juveniles’ competence to waive counsel, the impact of waivers on delivery of legal
services, and appellate courts’ inability to oversee juvenile justice administration. Subsection 4 examines juveniles’ right to a
jury trial. McKeiver’s denial of a jury undermines accurate factfinding, makes it easier to convict delinquents than criminal defendants, and heightens risks of wrongful convictions. States use
these flawed convictions to punish delinquents, to enhance criminal sentences, and to impose collateral consequences.
1. Police Interrogation of Juveniles
The Supreme Court has decided more cases about interrogating youths than any other issue of juvenile justice. 144 Although it repeatedly has questioned juveniles’ ability to exercise
143. THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL DISORDERS 161 (2004) [hereinafter GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY];
Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths’ Capacities As Trial Defendants,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 61, at 139 [hereinafter Grisso, What We Know]; Thomas Grisso et al.,
Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’
Capacities As Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003) [hereinafter Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial].
144. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011); Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652 (2004); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
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Miranda rights or make voluntary statements, it does not require special procedures to protect them. Rather, Fare v. Michael
C. endorsed the adult standard—knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of circumstances—to gauge juveniles’
Miranda waivers.145
Most states’ laws equate juveniles with adults even though
formal equality results in practical inequality. By contrast, developmental psychological research on juveniles’ competence to
exercise Miranda rights questions adolescents’ ability to understand warnings or exercise them effectively. 146 Empirical research on how youths respond to interrogation practices designed for adults highlights how developmental immaturity and
susceptibility to manipulation increase juveniles’ likelihood to
confess falsely.
a. The Law on the Books
In the decades prior to Miranda, the Court cautioned trial
judges to examine closely how youthfulness affected voluntariness of confessions and found lengthy questioning of youth and
the absence of a lawyer or parent could render confessions involuntary. 147 Gault reiterated concern that youthfulness adversely
596 (1948). See generally, BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM (2013) [hereinafter FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS] (discussing how youths’ prior record and responses influence in-

terrogations and how waivers of Miranda rights affect case processing); Barry
C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids,
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Behind Closed
Doors] (examining how police interrogation raises difficult legal, normative, and
policy questions, especially with regards to interrogation of juveniles).
145. Michael C., 422 U.S. at 725.
146. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 7–8; Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights].
147. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–601 (“ That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens . . . . [W]e
cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a
contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of
fear, then of panic . . . . The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the
duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him,
the callous attitude of the police toward his rights combine to convince us that
this was a confession wrung from a child by means which the law should not
sanction.”); Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54 (“[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated . . . is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding . . . and . . . is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get
the benefits of his constitutional rights . . . . Without some adult protection
against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone
assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”).
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affected the reliability of juveniles’ statements. 148 It ruled that
delinquency proceedings based on criminal allegations that
could lead to institutional confinement “must be regarded as
‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.” 149 It recognized that the Fifth Amendment contributes to
accurate factfinding and maintains the adversarial balance between (and protects the individual from) the State. 150 Gault assumed that youths could exercise rights and participate in the
legal process.
Fare v. Michael C. departed from the Court’s earlier concerns about youths’ vulnerability and held that the legal standard used to evaluate adults’ waivers—knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances—governed juveniles’ waivers as well.151 Michael C. reasoned that Miranda
provided an objective basis to evaluate waivers, denied that children’s developmental differences demanded special protections,
and required them to assert rights clearly.152
Miranda provided that if police question a suspect who is in
custody—arrested or “deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way”—they must administer a warning. 153 The Court
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina considered whether a thirteen-year148. Gault, 387 U.S. at 52 (“[A]uthoritative opinion has cast formidable
doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.”); see
also Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at
1137 (“Gault recognized that even greater protection might be required where
juveniles are involved, since their immaturity and greater vulnerability place
them at a greater disadvantage in their dealings with the police.”).
149. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49–50.
150. Id. at 47. The Court recognized a number of significant benefits of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination:
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the
question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits
of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. . . . One of
its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological
domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to
assist the state in securing his conviction.
Id.
151. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979); FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 35. The Court decided Michael C. as a Miranda case rather than as a juvenile interrogation case. Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 431, 449 (2006).
152. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 724–25; FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS,
supra note 144, at 35; Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 144.
153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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old juvenile’s age affected the Miranda custody analysis. 154 The
Court concluded that age was an objective factor that would affect how a young person might experience restraint. 155 J.D.B.
recognized that juveniles could feel restrained under circumstances in which an adult might not, and drew on Roper and
Graham’s diminished responsibility rationale to emphasize
youths’ immaturity, inexperience, and heightened vulnerability
during interrogation.156
Despite J.D.B.’s renewed concern about youths’ vulnerability, the vast majority of states use the same Miranda framework
for juveniles and adults. 157 Miranda only requires that suspects
understand the words of the warning and not collateral consequences of a waiver. Most states do not require a parent or lawyer to assist juveniles.158 When trial judges evaluate Miranda
waivers, they consider characteristics of the offender (age, education, IQ, and prior police contacts) and the context of interrogation (location, methods, and length of interrogation). 159 The
leading cases provide long lists of factors for trial judges to consider.160 Appellate courts identify many relevant elements, do
not assign controlling weight to any one variable, and defer to
trial judges’ decisions whether a juvenile made a valid waiver. 161
Without decisive factors, Michael C. provides no meaningful
check on judges’ discretion to find that youths waived their
rights. Judges regularly find valid waivers made by children as
young as ten or eleven years of age, with limited intelligence or
significant mental disorders, with no prior police contacts, and
without parental assistance. 162
154. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
155. Id. at 272 (“[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to
go. We think it clear that courts can account for that reality.”).
156. Id.
157. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 41.
158. Id. at 42; Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions,
Miranda, and the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 105, 105–06 [hereinafter
Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights].
159. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 42–43; Feld,
Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 158.
160. Fare v. Michael C., 441 U.S. 707 (1979); FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 42–43.
161. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 183; FELD, KIDS,
COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43.
162. See In re Joseph H., No. E059942, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 171, at *176, *186–
87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Joseph H., a ten-year-old with low intelli-
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About ten states presume that most juveniles lack capacity
to waive Miranda and require a parent or other adult to assist
them. 163 Some states require a parent for juveniles younger than
fourteen years, presume that those fourteen or sixteen years or
older are incompetent to waive, or oblige police to offer older
youths an opportunity to consult.164 Most commentators endorse
parental presence, even though many question the value of their
participation.165 Parents’ and children’s interests may conflict,
gence and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and such a waiver did not violate due process); FELD, KIDS, COPS,
AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43; Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal
Rights, supra note 158, at 105.
163. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43; Hillary B.
Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations:
Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1287 n.65 (2004) (listing Colorado,
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, and West Virginia as among the states with parental presence requirements); Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 158, at 116–18
(discussing various states’ per se rules for “assur[ing] the validity of a juvenile’s
waiver of rights or confession”); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV.
26, 36–37 (2006); King, supra note 151, at 451–52.
164. See, e.g., In re BMB, 955 P.2d 1302, 1312–13 (Kan. 1998) (holding that
“a juvenile under 14 years of age must be given an opportunity to consult with
his or her parent, guardian, or attorney as to whether he or she will waive his
or her rights to an attorney and against self-incrimination”); Commonwealth v.
A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (holding that for juveniles under
the age of fourteen, a parent or interested adult must be present and have “had
the opportunity to explain [the juvenile’s] rights to [him or her] so that [he or
she] understands the significance of waiver of these rights”); State v. Presha,
748 A.2d 1108, 1114 (N.J. 2000) (holding that “when a parent or guardian is
absent from an interrogation involving a juvenile [under the age of fourteen],
any confession resulting from the interrogation should be deemed inadmissible
as a matter of law, unless the adult was unwilling to be present or truly unavailable”).
165. States assume that a parent will understand rights, provide legal advice, mitigate coercive influences, prevent unreliable statements, and reduce
feelings of isolation. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 158, at
117–18; see Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I Didn’t Do It: Protecting the Rights of Juveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355, 374–77 (2002)
(outlining several states’ approaches to safeguarding juveniles’ Miranda rights
and expressing the view that those approaches which “render inadmissible any
statement by a juvenile made during the interrogation outside the presence of
an interested adult, such as a parent or attorney” are the “best way to provide
protection for a juvenile”). See generally Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan,
Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile
Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 153–55
(G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (endorsing a parental presence requirement even
though interrogators reduce parents’ role to passive observer). Parents may
pressure their children to tell the truth and confess. See, e.g., FELD, KIDS, COPS,
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for example, if the juvenile assaulted or stole from a parent, victimized another sibling, or if the parent is a suspect. Parents
may have a financial conflict of interest if they have to pay for
their child’s attorney; they may have an emotional reaction to
their child’s current arrest or chronic trouble; they may expect
their child to tell the truth, urge her to stop lying, or physically
threaten her to confess. Additionally, parents may not understand legal rights or consequences of waiver any better than
their child.
If youths differ from adults in understanding Miranda, conceiving of or exercising rights, or susceptibility to pressure, then
the law establishes a standard that few can meet and enables
states to take advantage of their limitations. Miranda requires
police to advise suspects of their rights, but some juveniles do
not understand the words or concepts. Psychologists studied the
vocabulary, concepts, and reading levels required to understand
warnings and concluded that they exceed many adolescents’ abilities. 166 Key words require an eighth-grade level of education
and most juveniles thirteen years or younger cannot grasp their
meaning.167 Some concepts—the meaning of a right, the term appointed to secure counsel, and waiver—require a high school education and render Miranda incomprehensible. 168 Many juveniles cannot define critical words in the warning. 169 Special
dumbed-down juvenile warnings are often longer and more difficult to understand.170 If demanding reading level or verbal complexity makes a warning unintelligible, then it cannot serve its
protective function.
Psychologist Thomas Grisso has studied juveniles’ exercise
of Miranda for more than four decades. He reports that many, if
not most, do not understand the warning well enough to make a
AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 44, 200–06; THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’
WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 180–81 (1981)
[hereinafter GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS].

166. See Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 72–85 (2008) [hereinafter Rogers, Comprehensibility and Content]; Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and
Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 135 (2008) [hereinafter Rogers, Language of Miranda Warnings].
167. Rogers, Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 166, at 78; Rogers,
Language of Miranda Warnings, supra note 166.
168. See Rogers, Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 166, at 78.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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valid waiver. 171 Although age, intelligence, and prior arrests correlated with Miranda comprehension, more than half of juveniles, as contrasted with less than one-quarter of adults, did not
understand at least one of the four warnings and only one-fifth
of juveniles, as compared with twice as many adults, grasped all
four warnings. 172 Juveniles fifteen years of age or younger exhibited significantly poorer comprehension of Miranda rights,
waived more readily, and confessed more frequently than did
older youths. 173 Other research reports that older youths understand Miranda about as well as adults, but many younger juveniles do not understand the words or concepts. 174 Adolescents
with low IQs perform more poorly than adults with low IQs, and
delinquent youths typically have lower IQs than do those in the
general population.175 The higher prevalence of mental disorders
compounds juveniles’ cognitive limitations, although police seldom are able to assess youths’ impairments when they question
them. 176
Even youths who understand Miranda’s words may be unable to exercise its rights. Juveniles do not appreciate the function
or importance of rights as well as adults and they are less competent defendants. 177 They have greater difficulty conceiving of
a right as an absolute entitlement that they can exercise without
adverse consequences.178 Juveniles view rights as something
171. GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 128–30;
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 1152–
54; Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 335;
Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 11 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso, Trial Defendants].
172. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 51–52; see
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 1151–
54.
173. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 52–53; see
Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at 1151–
54.
174. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 50–57 (reviewing research literature).
175. Id. at 53.
176. Id. at 52–53.
177. See GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 128–30;
Grisso, Trial Defendants, supra note 171 (distinguishing between understanding words of warning and appreciating the functions of rights); Kimberly Larson, Improving the “Kangaroo Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 629, 649–53 (2003) (reviewing social
psychological research and juveniles’ limited understanding of the concept of
“rights” as entitlements to be exercised).
178. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: New
Questions for an Era of Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS
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that authorities allow them to do, but which they may unilaterally retract or withhold.179 They misconceive the lawyer’s role
and attorney-client privilege. 180 Generally, youths with poorer
understanding of rights waive them at higher rates than those
with better comprehension. 181
Miranda characterized custodial interrogation as inherently
compelling because police dominate the setting and create psychological pressures to comply. 182 The differing legal and social
status of youths and adults render children questioned by authority figures more suggestible. We expect youths to answer
questions posed by police, teachers, parents, and other adults;
social expectations and children’s lower status increase their
vulnerability during interrogation.
Juveniles may waive rights and admit responsibility because they believe they should obey authority, acquiesce more
readily to negative pressure or critical feedback, and accede
more willingly to suggestions. 183 They impulsively confess to end
THE EYE: RETHINKING ASSESSMENT, COMPETENCY AND SENTENCING FOR A
HARSHER ERA OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 29–30 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial]; GRISSO, JUVENILES’
WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 130; Grisso, What We Know, supra note

143, at 148–49; Grisso, Trial Defendants, supra note 171 (“[A] larger proportion
of delinquent youths bring to the defendant role an incomplete comprehension
of the concept and meaning of a right as it applies to adversarial legal proceedings.”).
179. See, e.g., GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at
130.
180. See id. at 128.
181. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (discussing the correlation of juvenile waiver rates with comprehension of legal
rights).
182. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–58 (1966). See generally
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 345 (2003) (“[I]nterrogative suggestibility [is defined] as
‘[t]he extent to which, within a closed social interaction, people come to accept
messages communicated during formal questioning, as the result of which their
subsequent behavioural response is affected.’” (quoting Gisli H. Gudjonsson &
Noel K. Clark, Suggestibility in Police Interrogation: A Social Psychological
Model, 1 SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 83, 84 (1986))).
183. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 1005 (2004) (finding that
juveniles’ “eagerness to comply with adult authority figures, impulsivity, immature judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in decision-making,”
puts them at greater risk to confess falsely); Saul Kassin et al., Police-Induced
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 8
(2010) (“[Y]outh under age 15 . . . are more likely to believe that they should
waive their rights and tell what they have done, partly because they are still
young enough to believe that they should never disobey authority.”). Juveniles
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an interrogation, rather than consider long-term consequences. 184
The Court requires suspects to invoke Miranda rights
clearly and unambiguously. 185 However, some groups of people—
juveniles, females, or racial minorities—may speak indirectly or
tentatively to avoid conflict with those in power. 186 Davis v.
United States recognized that to require suspects to invoke
rights clearly and unambiguously could prove problematic for
some. 187 If a suspect thinks she has invoked her rights, but police
disregard it as an ambiguous request, then she may feel overwhelmed by their indifference and succumb to further questioning.
b. The Law in Action
Research on police interrogation reports that about eighty
percent of adults and ninety percent of juveniles waive their Miranda rights.188 The largest empirical study of juvenile interrogations reported that 92.8% waived. 189 Juveniles’ higher waiver
rates may reflect lack of understanding or inability to invoke Miranda effectively. 190 As with adults, youths with prior felony arrests invoked their rights more often than those with fewer or
less serious police contacts. 191 Youths who waived at prior arrests may have learned that they derived no benefit from cooperating, spent more time with lawyers, and gained greater understanding.

are more vulnerable to suggestion during questioning than adults. See
GUDJONSSON, supra note 182, at 381.
184. See GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 158–59;
Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 357.
185. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010); Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
186. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 318 (1993).
187. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (“[R]equiring a clear assertion of the right to
counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation,
lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate
their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”).
188. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 94; RICHARD
A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 280 (2008).
189. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 94; Barry C.
Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 12 (2013).
190. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 95–96.
191. Id. at 98–101; Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 144, at 431.
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Once officers secure a juvenile’s waiver, they question him
just like an adult. They employ the same maximization and minimization strategies used with adults to overcome young suspects’ resistance and to enable them to admit responsibility. 192
Maximization techniques intimidate suspects and impress on
them the futility of denial; minimization techniques provide
moral justifications or face-saving alternatives to enable them to
confess. 193 Despite youths’ greater susceptibility, police do not
incorporate developmental differences into the tactics they employ.194 They do not receive special training to question juveniles
and use the same tactics as with adults. 195 Techniques designed
to manipulate adults—aggressive questioning, presenting false
evidence, and using leading questions—create unique dangers
when employed with youths. 196
Some states require a parent to assist juveniles in the interrogation room although analysts question their protective
role.197 Parents—as adults—may have marginally greater un-

192. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 110; Kassin et
al., supra note 183, at 12.
193. See, e.g., FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 110,
126; Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 223 (2005) (discussing various interrogation techniques); Kassin et al., supra note 183, at 12 (explaining that
maximization tactics “convey the interrogator ’s rock-solid belief that the suspect is guilty and that all denials will fail. Such tactics include making an accusation, overriding objections, and citing evidence, real or manufactured, to shift
the suspect’s mental state from confident to hopeless.”). Minimization techniques “provide the suspect with moral justification and face-saving excuses for
having committed the crime in question. Using this approach, the interrogator
offers sympathy and understanding; normalizes and minimizes the crime.” Kassin et al., supra note 183, at 14.
194. Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al., Testimony and Interrogation of Minors:
Assumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 286, 291
(2006). See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (discussing police’s use of routine interrogation tactics with all suspects).
195. Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of
Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 243–46 (2006). See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (discussing lack of
special training for juvenile interrogation).
196. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing to the Extreme Youth of
the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 641, 671–77 (2002).
197. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 43–44;
GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 18; Jennifer L.
Woolard et al., Examining Adolescents’ and Their Parents’ Conceptual and Practical Knowledge of Police Interrogation: A Family Dyad Approach, 37 J. YOUTH
ADOLESCENCE 685, 687 (2008).
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derstanding of Miranda than their children, but both share misconceptions about police practices. 198 Often parents do not provide useful legal advice, they increase pressure to waive rights,
and many urge their children to tell the truth. 199 Parents may
be emotionally upset or angry at their child’s arrest, believe that
confessing will produce a better outcome, or may think their
child should respect authority or assume responsibility. If a parent is present, police either enlist them as allies in the interrogation or neutralize their presence and render them as passive
observers.200 In the vast majority of interrogations that parents
attended in a pertinent study, parents did not participate after
police gave their child a Miranda warning, sometimes switched
sides to become active allies of the police, and rarely played a
protective role. 201
c. Vulnerability and False Confessions
Research on false confessions underscores juveniles’ unique
vulnerability. 202 Younger adolescents are at greater risk to confess falsely than older ones; in one study, police obtained more
than one-third (thirty-five percent) of proven false confessions
from suspects younger than eighteen.203 In another study, false
confessions occurred in fifteen percent of cases, but juveniles accounted for forty-two percent of all false confessors and twothirds (sixty-nine percent) of those aged twelve to fifteen confessed to crimes they did not commit.204 Significantly, research
on exonerated juveniles who confess falsely involves only the
small group of youths prosecuted as adults. This reflects the seriousness of their crimes, the greater pressure on police to solve
them, and the longer period available to youths and their attorneys to correct the errors.
198. Woolard et al., supra note 197, at 688.
199. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 44–45; Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 181.
200. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 200–03.
201. Id. at 203–06.
202. Drizin & Leo, supra note 183, at 945; Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
523, 545 (2005); Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Development: Convictions of
Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904 (2010). See generally BRANDON L.
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG (2011) (discussing the unique vulnerability of juveniles in police interrogations and resulting false confessions).
203. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 183, at 945.
204. See Gross et al., supra note 202, at 545.
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Developmental psychologists attribute juveniles’ overrepresentation among false confessors to reduced cognitive ability, developmental immaturity, and increased susceptibility to manipulation. 205 They have fewer life experiences or psychological
resources with which to resist the pressures of interrogation.
They are more likely to comply with authority figures, tell police
what they think they want to hear, and respond to negative feedback. 206 Their impulsive decision-making and tendency to obey
authority heightens those risks, especially for younger juveniles
with limited understanding. The stress and anxiety of interrogation intensifies their desire to extricate themselves in the shortrun by waiving and confessing. The vulnerabilities of youth multiply when coupled with mental illness, mental retardation, or
compliant personalities.
d. Policy Recommendations
Research on false confessions underscores the unique vulnerability of younger juveniles.207 Miranda is especially problematic for younger juveniles who may not understand its words
or concepts. Miranda requires only shallow understanding of the
205. See Bonnie & Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 61, at 73, 87 (“[Y]ouths[ ] . . . may have significant deficits in competence-related abilities due . . . to developmental immaturity.”); Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 165, at 107, 114 (examining
research showing an inverse relationship between age and suggestibility); Ann
Tobey et al., Youths’ Trial Participation as Seen by Youths and Their Attorneys:
An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 225, 231–34 (discussing how juveniles are difficult clients for attorneys because they have difficulty remembering information, maintaining attention, and making decisions
appropriately); Drizin & Luloff, supra note 136, at 260.
206. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 182, at 381 (summarizing research which
showed that juveniles are “markedly more suggestible than adults” when subjected to interrogative pressure); LEO, supra note 188, at 233 (“Many juveniles . . . are highly compliant. They tend to be . . . acquiescent[ ] and eager to
please . . . when questioned by police.”).
207. See generally GARRETT, supra note 202 (discussing false confessions
and the unique vulnerability of adolescents compared to older juveniles and
adults); Drizin & Leo, supra note 183 (analyzing 125 interrogation-induced false
confession cases using a variety of demographic criteria and finding that juveniles are uniquely vulnerable); Gross et al., supra note 202 (finding that false
confessions were heavily concentrated among the most vulnerable groups of innocent defendants, including juveniles and individuals with mental disabilities); Tepfer et al., supra note 202 (finding that younger exonerees falsely confessed to crimes at nearly twice the rate of adult exonerees).
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words which developmental psychologists conclude most sixteen- and seventeen-year-old youths possess. By contrast, psychologists report that many, if not most, children fifteen or
younger do not understand Miranda or possess competence to
make legal decisions. 208
i.

Mandatory Counsel for Younger Juveniles

Younger juveniles’ limited understanding and heightened
vulnerability warrant greater procedural protections: a nonwaivable right to counsel. The Supreme Court’s juvenile interrogation cases—Haley, Gallegos, Gault, Fare, Alvarado, and J.D.B.—
excluded statements taken from youths fifteen years of age or
younger and admitted those obtained from sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. The Court’s de facto functional line—fifteen and
younger versus sixteen and older—closely tracks what psychologists report about youths’ ability to understand the warning.
Courts and legislatures should adopt that functional line and
provide greater protections for younger juveniles.
Psychologists advocate that juveniles younger than sixteen
years of age “should be accompanied and advised by a professional advocate, preferably an attorney, trained to serve in this
role.” 209 More than three decades ago, the American Bar Association (ABA) endorsed mandatory, nonwaivable counsel because
it recognized that “[f]ew juveniles have the experience and understanding to decide meaningfully that the assistance of counsel would not be helpful.” 210 Juveniles should consult with an attorney, rather than rely on parents, before they exercise or waive
rights. 211 Requiring consultation with an attorney assures a
functioning legal services delivery system and an informed and
voluntary waiver. If youths fifteen years of age or younger consult with counsel, it will somewhat limit police’s ability to secure
confessions. However, if younger juveniles cannot understand or
208. Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 146, at
1160; Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 356.
209. Kassin et al., supra note 183, at 30.
210. AM. BAR ASS’N & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 92 (1980).
211. Id. at 89–94 (discussing the “[s]cope of the juvenile’s right to counsel”);
Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault,
60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 167 (2007) (summarizing the findings of a variety of
studies and concluding that “fairness requires that juveniles have the benefit of
a nonwaivable right to counsel at every step in delinquency proceedings in order
to fulfill the promise of Gault”).
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exercise rights without assistance, then to treat them as if they
do enables the state to exploit their vulnerability. Constitutional
rights exist to assure factual accuracy, promote equality, and
protect individuals from governmental overreaching. Michael C.
emphasized lawyers’ unique role in the justice system, and Haley, Gallegos, and Gault recognized younger juveniles’ exceptional need for their assistance.
ii.

Limiting the Length of Interrogation

iii.

Mandatory Recording of Interrogation

The vast majority of interrogations are very brief. In previous studies, police completed nearly all interviews in less than
an hour and few took longer than two hours.212 By contrast, interrogations that elicit false confessions are usually long inquiries that wear down an innocent person’s resistance—eighty-four
percent took at least six hours—and youthfulness exacerbates
those dangers. 213 The Supreme Court has recognized that questioning juveniles for five or six hours renders their statement involuntary.214 Thus, states should create a sliding-scale presumption that a confession is involuntary and unreliable based on
length of interrogation.
Within the past decade, legal scholars, psychologists, law
enforcement, and justice system personnel have reached consensus that recording interrogations reduces coercion, diminishes
dangers of false confessions, and increases reliability. 215 More
than a dozen states require police to record interrogations, albeit
some under limited circumstances, such as with homicide or very
young suspects.216 Recording creates an objective record and provides an independent basis to resolve credibility disputes about
212. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 155–66; Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
279 (1996).
213. Drizin & Leo, supra note 183, at 948–49.
214. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948).
215. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (discussing the benefits of recording interrogations); GARRETT, supra note 202 (relaying the positive experiences of police and judges regarding the electronic recording of interrogations); LEO, supra note 188 (discussing how the recording of
police interrogations benefits all parties who value accurate factfinding and
more informed decision-making).
216. See GARRETT, supra note 202, at 248 (“Eleven states and the District of
Columbia now require or encourage electronic recording of at least some interrogations by statute, and seven more state supreme courts wrote opinions either
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Miranda warnings, waivers, or statements. It enables a judge to
decide whether a statement contains facts known to a guilty perpetrator or whether police supplied them to an innocent suspect.
Recording protects police from false claims of abuse, enhances
professionalism, and reduces coercion. It enables police to focus
on suspects’ responses, to review details of an interview not captured in written notes, and to test them against subsequently
discovered facts. Recording avoids distortions that occur when
interviewers rely on memory or notes to summarize a statement.
Police must record all interactions with suspects (preliminary interviews and interrogations) rather than just a final
statement (a post-admission narrative). Otherwise, police may
conduct a preinterrogation interview, elicit incriminating information, and then construct a final confession after the cat is out
of the bag. Only a complete record of every interaction can protect against a final statement that ratifies an earlier coerced one
or against a false confession contaminated by nonpublic facts
that police supplied a suspect.
2. Competence to Stand Trial
Gault’s procedural rights are of no value to youths unable to
exercise them. The Supreme Court long has required that defendants be competent to preserve the integrity of trials, to promote factual accuracy, to reduce risk of error, and to enable them
to play a part in proceedings. 217 Dusky v. United States held that
a defendant must possess “sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [and have] a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.”218 Drope v. Missouri held that “a
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” 219 The standard is functional and binary: a defendant either is or is not competent to
stand trial.
requiring or encouraging the recording of interrogations.”); LEO, supra note 188,
at 295 (“At the time of this writing, eight states . . . and the District of Columbia
have laws requiring police to record interrogations in their entirety in some or
all criminal cases.”).
217. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 800 (2005).
218. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
219. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
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The standard for competency is not onerous because the
more capability it requires of moderately impaired defendants,
the fewer who will meet it. 220 Juveniles must understand the
trial process, have the ability to reason and work with counsel,
and rationally appreciate their situation. If a person understands that he is on trial for committing crimes, knows he can be
sentenced if convicted, and can communicate with his attorney,
a court likely would find him competent. Significant mental illness—psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia—or severe
mental retardation typically render adult defendants incompetent. However, psychotic disorders typically do not emerge until
late adolescence or early adulthood and the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders cautions against diagnosing profound illnesses in
younger populations. 221 Despite that reservation, researchers report that the prevalence of mental disorders among delinquent
youths is substantially higher than in the general population—
half to three-quarters exhibit one or more mental illnesses. 222
Developmental psychologists contend that immaturity per
se—especially for younger juveniles—produces the same deficits
of understanding and inability to assist counsel that mental illness or retardation engender in incompetent adults. 223 Youths’
developmental limitations adversely affect their ability to pay
attention, absorb and apply information, understand proceedings, make rational decisions, and work with counsel.224
Significant age-related differences appear between adolescents’ and young adults’ competence, judgment, and legal decision-making.225 Developmental psychologists report that many
juveniles younger than fourteen years of age were as severely
impaired as adults found incompetent to stand trial.226 Some
220. Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading
Through the Rhetoric and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 137
(2009).
221. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 88–89 (5th ed. 2013).
222. GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 143, at 10–11.
223. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 151–52; Scott & Grisso, supra
note 217, at 796.
224. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 158–60; Scott & Grisso, supra
note 217, at 795–96.
225. See Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143,
at 343–46.
226. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 162–65; Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at 356.
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older youths also exhibited substantial impairments. 227 Age and
intelligence produced higher levels of incompetence among adolescents with low IQs than adults with low IQs.228 The MacArthur study reported that about one-fifth of fourteen- to fifteenyear-olds were as impaired as mentally ill adults found incompetent; those with below-average intelligence were more likely
than juveniles with average intelligence to be incompetent. 229
Even nominally competent adolescents may suffer from cognitive deficits—borderline intelligence, limited verbal ability,
short attention span, or imperfect memory—that adversely affect understanding and decision-making.
While incompetence in adults stems from mental disorders,
which may be transient or treatable with medication, it is less
clear how to accelerate legal capacities in adolescents whose deficits result from developmental immaturity. 230 Competency restoration may be especially problematic for younger juveniles who
never possessed relevant knowledge or understanding to begin
with. 231 Moreover, adolescents deemed incompetent due to mental retardation may be especially difficult to remediate or restore
to competence. 232
The prevalence of mental illness among delinquents compounds their developmental incompetence. In many jurisdictions, the juvenile justice system has become the de facto mental
health system as a result of inadequate mental health services
for children. 233 Analysts estimate that half or more of male delinquents and a larger proportion of female delinquents suffer
227. See Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143,
at 344 (reporting that seven percent of sixteen to seventeen-year-olds showed
“significantly impaired [u]nderstanding,” compared with twenty percent of
eleven to thirteen-year-olds and thirteen percent of fourteen to fifteen-yearolds).
228. See Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143,
at 356; Sanborn, supra note 220, at 171–72.
229. Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 143, at
356.
230. Jodi Viljoen et al., Competence and Criminal Responsibility in Adolescent Defendants: The Roles of Mental Illness and Adolescent Development, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 38, at 526, 535 [hereinafter Viljoen et al., Competence and Criminal Responsibility]; Jodi L. Viljoen & Thomas Grisso, Prospects for Remediating Juveniles’ Adjudicative Incompetence, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 87, 107–08
(2007).
231. Scott & Grisso, supra note 217, at 797.
232. See Viljoen et al., Competence and Criminal Responsibility, supra note
230, at 530; Sanborn, supra note 220, at 145–47.
233. GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 143, at 5 (discussing the lack of
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from one or more mental disorders. 234 Youths suffering from Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) may have difficulty concentrating or communicating with their attorney and
those suffering from depression may lack the motivation to do
so.
The issue of competence to stand trial arises both for youth
transferred to and tried in criminal court and for those prosecuted in juvenile court. For youths tried as adults, criminal
courts apply the Dusky/Drope standard, but focus on mental illness rather than developmental immaturity.235 For youths tried
in juvenile courts, about half the states have addressed competency in statutes, court rules, or case law.236 However, most statutes consider only mental illness or retardation as sources of incompetence rather than developmental immaturity per se. 237
Even after states recognize juveniles’ right to a competency
determination in delinquency proceedings, they differ over
whether to apply the Dusky/Drope adult standard or a juvenilenormed standard. Some courts apply the adult standard in delinquency as well as criminal prosecutions because both may result in a child’s loss of liberty and punitive consequences. 238
Other jurisdictions opt for a relaxed competency standard on the
theory that delinquency hearings are less complex and penalties
less severe. 239
Advocates for a watered-down standard of competence in delinquency proceedings contend that a youth who might be found
incompetent to stand trial as an adult or if evaluated under an
public mental health services for children and adolescents in many states and
the subsequent referral of youths with mental disorders to the juvenile justice
system).
234. Id. at 6–13; Viljoen et al., Competence and Criminal Responsibility, supra note 230, at 529 (reporting that “approximately 60% of detained male adolescents and 70% of detained female adolescents met criteria for a current mental disorder ”).
235. See Sanborn, supra note 220, at 147–49; Scott & Grisso, supra note 217,
at 804–05.
236. See Sanborn, supra note 220, at 140–42. See generally FELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra note 29, at 117–33 (discussing various states’ frameworks for
addressing competency); Scott & Grisso, supra note 217 (discussing juvenile
competency schemes in a variety of jurisdictions).
237. Viljoen et al., Competence and Criminal Responsibility, supra note 230,
at 532; Sanborn, supra note 220, at 141–42.
238. See, e.g., In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C. App. 1990); In re
D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278, 280–82 (Minn. Ct. Ap. 1998).
239. See, e.g., In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Ind. 2004); In re Bailey, 782
N.E.2d 1177, 1177 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Sanborn, supra note 220, at 141–42;
Scott & Grisso, supra note 217, at 803–04.
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adult standard in juvenile court should still be found competent
under a relaxed standard. 240 They insist that if delinquency
sanctions are less punitive than criminal sentences and geared
to promote youths’ welfare, then they require fewer procedural
safeguards.241 However, the constitutional requirement of competence hinges on defendants’ ability to participate in proceedings and the legitimacy of the trial process, and not the punishment that may ensue. Although delinquency dispositions,
especially for serious crimes, may be shorter than criminal sentences, as I argued above, it is disingenuous to claim they are not
punitive. Baldwin v. New York held that no crime that carried
an authorized sentence of six months or longer could be deemed
a petty offense. 242 While proponents of a watered-down standard
argue that a rule that immunizes some incompetent youths from
adjudication could undermine juvenile courts’ legitimacy,243 adjudicating immature youths under a relaxed standard enables
the state to take advantage of their incompetence and undermines the legitimacy of the process. A finding of delinquency requires proof of guilt. Either defendants understand the proceedings and can assist counsel or they cannot; if they cannot perform
those minimal tasks, then they should not be prosecuted in any
court.
Juvenile courts do not routinely initiate competency evaluations, even for young offenders, and many delinquents may face
charges without understanding the process or the ability to work
with counsel. Defense attorneys may be best positioned to detect
whether a competency evaluation is warranted, but often fail to
do so because of heavy caseloads, limited time spent with a client, and an inability to distinguish between immaturity and disabling incompetence. 244 Defense counsel tactically may not raise
a juvenile’s incompetence because of the delays for competency
evaluation and restoration. 245 And justice system personnel may
lack evaluation instruments or clinical personnel who can administer them.246
240. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 168–77; Scott & Grisso, supra
note 217, at 831–39.
241. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 217, at 840–43.
242. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
243. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 173.
244. Viljoen et al., Competence and Responsibility, supra note 230, at 533–
34.
245. GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 143, at 168–70.
246. Id. at 77–80.
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3. Access to Counsel
Gideon v. Wainwright applied the Sixth Amendment to the
states to guarantee criminal defendants’ right to counsel. 247
Gault relied on Gideon, compared a delinquency proceeding to a
felony prosecution, and granted delinquents the right to counsel.248 However, Gault used the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment and did not
mandate automatic appointment of counsel. 249 Gault, like Gideon, left to state and local governments the task to fund legal
services. Over the past half-century, penurious politicians who
want to get tough on crime and avoid coddling criminals have
shirked their responsibility to adequately fund public defenders’
offices and have severely undermined the quality of justice.
Gault required a judge to advise the child and parent of the
right to have a lawyer appointed if indigent, but ruled that juveniles could waive counsel. 250 Most states do not use special procedural safeguards—mandatory nonwaivable appointment or
prewaiver consultation with a lawyer—to protect delinquents
from improvident decisions. 251 Instead, they use the adult standard—knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—to gauge juveniles’
relinquishment of counsel. As with Miranda waivers, formal
equality results in practical inequality—lawyers represent delinquents at much lower rates than they do criminal defendants.252
Despite statutes and court rules of procedure that apply
equally throughout a state, juvenile justice administration varies with urban, suburban, and rural context and produces justice
by geography. 253 Lawyers appear more frequently in urban
247. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
248. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
249. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27–31; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45.
250. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42.
251. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42; Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note
29, at 183–90. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (discussing a lack of procedural safeguards in most jurisdictions).
252. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63, at 4; CAROLINE WOLF
HARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (U.S. DOJ 2000); JUDITH B.
JONES, ACCESS TO COUNSEL (OJJDP 2004); George W. Burruss, Jr. & Kimberly
Kempf-Leonard, The Questionable Advantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile
Court, 19 JUST. Q. 37, 37–39 (2002); Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A
Cross-State Comparison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME &
DELINQ. 393, 399–402 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, In re Gault Revisited]; Feld,
Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at 1217–23.
253. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 60–65; Feld, Justice by
Geography, supra note 63, at 157–58; Barry C. Feld & Shelly Schaefer, The

2017]

COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY

523

courts than in more informal rural courts. 254 In turn, more formal urban courts hold more youths in pretrial detention and sentence them more severely. 255 Finally, a lawyer’s presence is an
aggravating factor at disposition; judges sentence youths who
appear with counsel more severely than they do those who appear without an attorney. 256 Several factors contribute to this
finding: (1) lawyers who appear in juvenile court may be incompetent and prejudice their clients’ cases; (2) judges may predetermine sentences and appoint counsel when they anticipate outof-home placements; or (3) judges may punish delinquents for
exercising procedural rights. 257
a. Presence of Counsel

When the Court decided Gault, lawyers appeared in fewer
than five percent of delinquency cases, in part because juvenile
court judges actively discouraged juveniles from retaining counsel and the courts’ informality prevented lawyers from playing
an advocate’s role. 258 Although states amended their juvenile
codes to comply with Gault, evaluations of initial compliance
found that most judges did not advise juveniles of their rights

Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: Law Reform to Deliver Legal Services and
Reduce Justice by Geography, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 327, 328 (2010)
[hereinafter Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform]; Barry C. Feld & Shelly Schaefer,
The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: The Conundrum of Attorneys as an Aggravating Factor at Disposition, 27 JUST. Q. 713 (2010) [hereinafter Feld &
Schaefer, Right to Counsel]. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra
note 63 (discussing and analyzing the juvenile justice system and the right
counsel).
254. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 53, 60–65; Feld, Justice
by Geography, supra note 63, at 185. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (discussing and analyzing the juvenile justice system and
the right to counsel).
255. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 60–65; Feld, Justice by
Geography, supra note 63, at 194–97. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (discussing and analyzing the juvenile justice system and
the right counsel).
256. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 60–65; Feld, Justice by
Geography, supra note 63, at 190; Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at
1236–44; Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 714.
257. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 43–44; Feld & Schaefer,
Right to Counsel, supra note 253.
258. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64,
at 1192. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (reviewing
research on delivery of legal services).

524

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:473

and the vast majority did not appoint counsel. 259 Studies in the
1970s and 1980s reported that many judges did not advise juveniles of their right to a lawyer and most did not appoint counsel.260 Research in Minnesota in the mid-1980s reported that
most youths appeared without counsel, that rates of representation varied widely in urban, suburban, and rural counties, and
that one-third of youths whom judges removed from home and
one-quarter of those in institutions were unrepresented. 261 A
decade later, about one-quarter of juveniles removed from home
were unrepresented despite legal reforms to eliminate the practice. 262 A study of delivery of legal services in six states reported
that only three of them appointed counsel for a substantial majority of juveniles.263 Studies in the 1990s described juvenile
court judges’ continuing failure to appoint lawyers. 264 In 1995,
the General Accounting Office confirmed that rates of representation varied widely among and within states and that judges
tried and sentenced many unrepresented youths. 265
In the mid-1990s the ABA published two reports on juveniles’ legal needs. America’s Children at Risk reported that many
children appeared without counsel and that lawyers who represented youth lacked adequate training and often failed to provide effective assistance. 266 A Call for Justice, which focused on
the quality of defense lawyers, again reported that many youths
259. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at
1199–1200. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (reviewing research on delivery of legal services).
260. See Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at 1199–1200. See generally
FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (reviewing research on delivery of
legal services).
261. Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 252, at 394–95; Feld, Justice by
Geography, supra note 63; see Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at 1199–
1200, 1213–44.
262. Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 730; see Feld &
Schaefer, Law Reform, supra note 253, at 333–35 (discussing Minnesota’s reform laws to improve legal representation of juvenile delinquents).
263. Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 252, at 396, 416.
264. See GAO, GAO/GGD-95-139, JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION
RATES VARIED AS DID COUNSEL’S IMPACT ON COURT OUTCOMES (1995) (reporting on variations of representation rates in California, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska); see also NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., ACCESS DENIED: A NATIONAL
SNAPSHOT OF STATES’ FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4,
25–27 (2017), https://www.njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Snapshot
-Final_single-4.pdf.
265. GAO, supra note 264, at 13.
266. AM. BAR ASS’N PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GRP. ON THE UNMET LEGAL
NEEDS OF CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 60 (1993).
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appeared without counsel and that many attorneys failed to appreciate the challenges of representing young clients. 267 Since
the late 1990s, the ABA and the National Juvenile Defender
Center have conducted more than twenty state-by-state assessments, reporting that many, if not most, juveniles appeared
without counsel and that lawyers who represented youth often
encountered structural impediments to effective advocacy—
heavy caseloads, inadequate resources, lack of training, and the
like.268
b. Waivers of Counsel

Several factors account for why so many youths appear in
juvenile courts without counsel. Public defender services may be
less available or nonexistent in nonurban areas.269 Judges may
give cursory advisories of the right to counsel, imply that waivers
are just legal technicalities, and readily find waivers to ease
their administrative burdens. 270 If judges expect to impose noncustodial sentences, then they may dispense with counsel. Some
jurisdictions charge fees to determine a youth’s eligibility for a
public defender and others base youths’ eligibility on their parents’ income. 271 Parents may be reluctant to retain or accept an
attorney if, as in many states, they may have to reimburse attorney fees if they can afford them.272
The most common explanation for why fifty to ninety percent of juveniles in many states are unrepresented is that they

267. AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 52–56 (1995).

268. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 136, at 220; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 1, at 200–01; NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 264, at 34. For
more detail and access to the state assessments from the National Juvenile Defender Center, see State Assessments, NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., http://www
.njdc.info/our-work/juvenile-indigent-defense-assessments (last visited Nov. 15,
2017) (providing state assessments through “comprehensive examinations of
the systemic and institutional barriers that prevent children from receiving
high-quality legal representation”).
269. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 127.
270. AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., supra note 267, at 44–45; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 199; Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577
(2002).
271. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 199.
272. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 127–28; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 1, at 199.
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waive counsel.273 Judges in most states use the adult standard
to gauge juveniles’ waivers of counsel and consider the same factors—age, education, IQ, prior police contacts, or court experience—as those in Miranda waivers. 274 Many juveniles do not understand their rights or the role of lawyers and waive counsel
without consulting with either a parent or an attorney.275 Although judges are supposed to conduct a dialogue to determine
whether a child can understand rights and represent herself,
they frequently fail to give any waiver of counsel advisory, often
neglect to create a record, and readily accept waivers from manifestly incompetent children. 276 Many juveniles’ marginal competence to stand trial exacerbates the dangers of improvident
waivers. Judges who give waiver of counsel advisories often seek
waivers to ease their administrative burdens, which affects how
they inform juveniles of their rights and interpret their responses.277 As long as the law allows juveniles to waive counsel,
judges can find valid waivers regardless of youths’ incompetence.
Juveniles’ diminished competence, inability to understand proceedings, and judicial incentives and encouragement to waive
counsel results in larger proportions of delinquents adjudicated
without lawyers than criminal defendants.278
c. Pleas Without Bargains
Like adult criminal defendants, nearly all delinquents plead
guilty and proceed to sentencing. 279 Even though pleading guilty
is the most critical decision a delinquent makes, states use adult
waiver standards to evaluate their pleas. 280 Judges and lawyers
273. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 128; Berkheiser, supra note 270, at
649–50; see FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63, at 4; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 199–200.
274. See Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 144, at 402; see also FELD,
KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 41–45.
275. Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 629–31.
276. See In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 722 (Conn. 1988) (concluding the
juvenile did not “knowingly and voluntarily” waive the right to an attorney, notwithstanding court records indicating an affirmative response to the judge’s
question about waiving counsel); Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 633–34; Drizin
& Luloff, supra note 136, at 285–86.
277. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 128.
278. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144 (discussing law and policy concerning juveniles’ encounters with the law).
279. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 201–02. See generally FELD,
JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (discussing and analyzing the juvenile
justice system and the right to counsel).
280. See Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Pleading Guilty in Juvenile Court: Minimal
Ado About Something Very Important to Young Defendants, 9 JUST. Q. 127, 127
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often speak with juveniles in complicated legal language and fail
to explain long-term consequences of pleading guilty. 281 A valid
guilty plea requires a judge to conduct a colloquy on the record,
in which an offender admits the facts of the offense, acknowledges the rights being relinquished, and demonstrates that she
understands the charges and potential consequences. Because
appellate courts seldom review juveniles’ waivers of counsel,
pleas made without counsel receive even less judicial scrutiny. 282
Guilty pleas by factually innocent youths occur because attorneys fail to investigate cases, assume their clients’ guilt—especially if they have already confessed—and avoid adversarial litigation, discovery requests, and pretrial motions that conflict
with juvenile courts’ cooperative ideology. Juveniles’ emphasis
on short-term over long-term consequences and dependence on
adult authority figures increases their likelihood to enter false
guilty pleas.283
d. Counsel as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing
Historically, juvenile court judges discouraged adversarial
litigants and impeded effective advocacy. Today, lawyers in juvenile courts may put their clients at a disadvantage when
judges sentence them. 284 Research that controls for legal variables—present offense, prior record, pretrial detention, and the
like—consistently reports that judges remove from home and incarcerate delinquents who appeared with counsel more frequently than unrepresented youths. 285 Legal reforms to improve

(1992); see also Lacey Cole Singleton, Study Note, Say “Pleas”: Juveniles’ Competence to Enter Plea Agreements, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 439, 446 (2007).
281. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 201–02.
282. See Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 633. See generally Sanborn, supra
note 280 (examining the juvenile guilty plea process through statutes, court
rules, and case law from all fifty states).
283. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 48–49.
284. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252, at 41–45; Feld, In re Gault
Revisited, supra note 252, at 418–19; Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64, at
1330–31. See generally Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253 (discussing attorneys as an aggravating factor in juvenile dispositions).
285. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 252. See generally FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 63 (reviewing research on aggravating impact
of representation); Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 64 (analyzing variations
in rates of representation and the effects of attorneys in juvenile delinquency
and status proceedings in Minnesota in 1986); Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform,
supra note 253 (reporting on inconsistent judicial compliance with the Gault
requirement for appointment of counsel in juvenile courts); Feld & Schaefer,
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delivery of legal services actually increase the aggravating effect
of representation on dispositions. 286
Several factors contribute to lawyers’ negative impact at disposition. First, juveniles may not believe lawyers’ explanations
of confidential communications and withhold important information to their detriment. 287 Second, lawyers assigned to juvenile court may be incompetent and prejudice their clients’ cases;
public defender offices often send their least capable or newest
attorneys to juvenile court to gain trial experience. 288 Third, lack
of adequate funding for defender services may preclude investigations, which increases the risk of wrongful convictions;289 defense attorneys seldom investigate cases or interview their clients prior to trial because of heavy caseloads and limited
organizational support.290 Fourth, court-appointed lawyers may
place a greater premium on maintaining good relations with
judges who assign their cases than vigorously defending their
revolving clients. 291 Juvenile courts’ parens patriae ideology discourages zealous advocacy and engenders adverse consequences
for attorneys who rock the boat or for their clients. 292 Fifth, and
most significantly, many defense attorneys work under conditions that create structural impediments to quality representation. 293 Assessments in dozens of states report derisory working
conditions—crushing caseloads, penurious compensation, scant
support services, inexperienced attorneys, and inadequate supervision—that detract from or preclude effective representation.294 Ineffective assistance of counsel, for whatever reason, is
a significant factor in one-quarter of wrongful convictions.295
Right to Counsel, supra note 253 (comparing how Minnesota juvenile courts processed youths in 1994, prior to reform laws enacted in 1995, with how state
juvenile courts processed youths in 1999).
286. See Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform, supra note 253; see also Feld &
Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253 (comparing pre- and post-reform
rates of representation in Minnesota).
287. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 129.
288. Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 717.
289. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 136, at 284.
290. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 200.
291. Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 717.
292. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 201; Drizin & Luloff, supra
note 136, at 291.
293. AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., supra note 267, at 6.
294. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 58; State Assessments, supra note 268.
295. See generally GARRETT, supra note 202 (examining the factors contributing to 250 cases of wrongful criminal convictions ultimately exonerated by
DNA evidence).
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Another explanation of lawyers’ negative impact on dispositions is that judges may appoint them when they anticipate
more severe sentences. The Court in Scott v. Illinois prohibited
“incarceration without representation” and limited an indigent
adult misdemeanant’s right to appointed counsel to cases in
which judges ordered defendants’ actual confinement. 296 In most
states, the same judge presides at a youth’s arraignment, detention hearing, adjudication, and disposition and may appoint
counsel if she anticipates a more severe sentence.297 Judges typically appoint counsel, if at all, at the arraignment, detention
hearing, or on the day of trial. 298 Court practices that appoint
lawyers who meet their clients for the first time on the day of
trial create a system conducive to inadequate representation and
wrongful convictions.
Finally, judges may sentence delinquents who appear with
counsel more severely than those who waive because the lawyer’s presence insulates them from appellate reversal. Juvenile
court judges may sanction youths whose lawyers invoke formal
procedures, disrupt routine procedures, or question their discretion in ways similar to an adult defendant’s trial penalty—the
harsher sentences imposed on those who demand a jury trial rather than plead guilty.
e. Appellate Review
Gault rejected the juvenile’s request for a constitutional
right to appellate review because it had not found that criminal
defendants enjoyed such a right. 299 However, states invariably
provided adult defendants with a statutory right to appellate review. By avoiding the constitutional issue, the Court undermined the other rights that it granted delinquents because the
only way to enforce its rules would have been through rigorous
appellate review of juvenile court judges’ decisions. 300 Regardless of how poorly lawyers perform, appellate courts seldom can
correct juvenile courts’ errors. Juvenile defenders appeal adverse decisions far less frequently than lawyers representing
adult criminal defendants and often lack a record with which to
296. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Feld & Schaefer, Right to
Counsel, supra note 253, at 730.
297. Feld & Schaefer, Right to Counsel, supra note 253, at 718.
298. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 198–99.
299. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
300. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 158 (1998).

530

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:473

challenge an invalid waiver of counsel or trial errors. 301 Juvenile
court culture may discourage appeals as an impediment to a
youth assuming responsibility. The vast majority of delinquents
enter guilty pleas, which waive the right to appeal and further
precludes review. 302 Moreover, juveniles who waive counsel at
trial will be less aware of or able to pursue an appeal.
f.

Conclusion
The formal procedures of juvenile and criminal courts have
converged in the decades since Gault. Differences in age and
competence would suggest that youths should receive more safeguards than adults to protect them from punitive delinquency
adjudications and their own limitations. However, states do not
provide juveniles with additional safeguards—mandatory
nonwaivable appointment of counsel or prewaiver consultation
with a lawyer—to protect them from their own immaturity. Instead, they use adult legal standards that most youths are unlikely to meet.
High rates of waiver undermine the legitimacy of the juvenile justice system because assistance of counsel is the prerequisite to the exercise of other rights. 303 Youths require safeguards
which only lawyers can provide to protect against erroneous and
punitive state intervention. The direct consequence of delinquency convictions—institutional confinement—and use of prior
convictions to sentence recidivists more harshly, to waive youths
to criminal court, and to enhance criminal sentences makes assistance of counsel imperative. A justice system that recognizes
youths’ developmental limitations would provide, at a minimum,
no pretrial waivers of Miranda rights or counsel without prior
consultation with counsel. Only mandatory nonwaivable counsel
can prevent erroneous convictions and collateral use of adjudications that compound injustice. Lawyers can only represent delinquents effectively if they have adequate support, resources,
and specialized training to represent children.

301. See Berkheiser, supra note 270, at 619, 650; Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209, 218–22 (1994).
302. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 144, at 20.
303. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 136, at 287–88. See generally Martin
Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553
(1998) (examining systematic issues with juvenile court in the wake of
McKeiver).
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As Michael C. repeatedly emphasized, lawyers play a unique
role in the legal process and only they can effectively invoke the
procedural safeguards that are every citizens’ right. A rule that
requires mandatory nonwaivable appointment of counsel would
impose substantial costs and burdens on legal services delivery
in most states. But after Gault, all juveniles are entitled to appointed counsel. Waiver doctrines to relieve states’ fiscal or administrative burdens are scant justifications to deny fundamental rights.
4. Jury Trial: Factfinding, Governmental Oppression, and
Collateral Consequences
States’ laws treat juveniles just like adults when formal
equality produces practical inequality. Conversely, they use juvenile court procedures that provide less effective protection
when called upon to provide delinquents with adult safeguards.
Duncan v. Louisiana gave adult defendants the right to a jury
trial to assure accurate factfinding and to prevent governmental
oppression.304 By contrast, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied delinquents protections the Court deemed fundamental to criminal
trials. 305 The presence of lay citizens functions as a check on the
State, provides protection against vindictive prosecutors or biased judges, upholds the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and enhances the transparency and accountability of the justice system. Despite those salutary functions,
McKeiver insisted that delinquency proceedings were not yet
criminal prosecutions despite their manifold criminal aspects. 306
The McKeiver plurality reasoned that a judge could find
facts as accurately as a jury, rejected concerns that informality
could compromise factfinding, invoked the imagery of a paternalistic judge, and disregarded delinquents’ need for protection
from punitive state overreaching. 307 The Court feared that jury
trials would interfere with juvenile courts’ informality, flexibility, and confidentiality, make juvenile and criminal courts procedurally indistinguishable, and lead to abandonment of the juvenile court. 308
304. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
305. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
306. Id. at 541.
307. Id.; Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1143–45; see also
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 160 (questioning McKeiver ’s reasoning based on evidence suggesting that judges convict defendants at higher
rates than juries).
308. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550–51.
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The McKeiver dissenters insisted that when the State
charged a delinquent with a crime for which it could incarcerate
her, she should enjoy the same jury right as an adult. 309 For
them, Gault’s rationale—criminal charges and the possibility of
confinement—required comparable procedural safeguards. 310
The dissenters feared that juvenile courts’ informality would
contaminate factfinding. 311 Although the vast majority of delinquents, like criminal defendants, plead guilty, the possibility of
a jury trial provides an important check on prosecutorial overcharging, on judges’ evidentiary rulings, and the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the prevalence of guilty
pleas, lawyers are supposed to evaluate cases as if they were to
go to trial and practice in the shadow of the jury. The possibility
of a jury trial increases the visibility and accountability of justice
administration and the performance of lawyers and judges. The
jury’s checking function may be even more important in highly
discretionary, low visibility juvenile courts that deal with dependent youths who cannot effectively protect themselves.
A few states give juveniles a right to a jury trial as a matter
of state law, but the vast majority do not. 312 During the Get
Tough Era, states revised their juvenile codes’ purpose, opened
delinquency trials to the public, adopted determinate or mandatory sentencing laws, fostered a punitive convergence with criminal courts, imposed collateral consequences for delinquency convictions, and eroded the rationale for fewer procedural
safeguards.313 Despite the explicit shift from treatment to punishment, most state courts continue to deny juveniles a jury.314
Constitutional procedural protections serve dual functions:
assure accurate factfinding and protect against governmental
oppression. McKeiver’s denial of a jury fails on both counts.
First, judges and juries find facts differently and when they differ, judges are more likely to convict than a panel of laypeople.
309. Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra
note 17, at 1145–46.
310. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 564 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
312. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1155.
313. See generally, TORBET ET AL., supra note 48 (reporting states’ punitive
legislative actions from 1992 to 1995 in response to an increase in juvenile arrests and public perception of crime).
314. See State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. 2002); In re J.F., 714 A.2d
467, 475 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); State v. Hezzie R. (In re Hezzie R.), 580 N.W.2d
660, 678 (Wis. 1998); Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1155–59,
1190–91.
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Second, punitive sanctions increase the need to protect delinquents from direct and collateral consequences of convictions.
Providing delinquents with a second-rate criminal court denies
them fundamental fairness, undermines the legitimacy of the
process, and increases the likelihood of wrongful convictions.
a. Accurate Factfinding

Winship reasoned that the seriousness of proceedings and
the consequences for a defendant—juvenile or adult—required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.315 McKeiver assumed that
judges could find facts as accurately as juries. 316 Its rejection of
jury trials undermines factual accuracy and increases the likelihood that outcomes will differ in delinquency and criminal trials.
Although juries and judges agree about defendants’ guilt or innocence in about four-fifths of criminal cases, when they differ,
juries acquit more often than do judges. 317
Factfinding by judges and juries differs because juvenile
court judges may preside over hundreds of cases a year, while a
juror may only participate in one or two cases in a lifetime. 318
Several factors contribute to jurors’ greater propensity to acquit
than judges. The presence of jurors affects the ways in which
lawyers present their cases.319 As judges hear many cases, they
may become less meticulous when they weigh evidence and apply less stringently the reasonable doubt standard than do jurors. 320 Judges hear testimony from police and probation officers
on a recurring basis and form settled opinions about their credibility. 321 Similarly, judges may have formed an opinion about a
youth’s credibility, character, or the case from hearing earlier
charges against her or presiding at a detention hearing.

315. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365–68 (1970).
316. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
317. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 185–90,
209–13 (1966).
318. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Re-constructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083,
1124 (1991).
319. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 303, at 579–80 (discussing differences in attorneys’ use of opening statements between a jury trial and a bench
trial).
320. See id. at 564 (describing examples of convictions by judges that were
based on scant evidence).
321. Ainsworth, supra note 318.
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Delinquency proceedings’ informality compounds differences between judge and jury factfinding and further disadvantages delinquents. Judges in criminal cases instruct jurors
about the applicable law. By contrast, a judge in a bench trial
does not discuss either the law or the evidence before reaching a
conclusion, which makes it more difficult for an appellate court
to determine whether the law was correctly understood and applied. Further, a lack of diverse opinions increases the variability of outcomes. Ballew v. Georgia recognized the superiority of
group decision-making over individual judgments. In jury trials,
some group members remember facts that others forget, and deliberations air competing views and promote more accurate decisions. 322 By contrast, in bench trials, judges administer the
courtroom, make evidentiary rulings, take notes, and conduct
sidebars with lawyers, which divert their attention during proceedings. 323
The greater flexibility and informality of closed juvenile proceedings compounds the differences between judge and jury reasonable doubt. When a judge presides at a youth’s detention
hearing, she receives information about the offense, criminal history, and social background, which may contaminate impartial
factfinding. 324 Exposure to nonguilt related evidence increases
the likelihood that a judge subsequently will convict and institutionalize her. 325 Some differences between judges and juries reflect the latter’s use of a higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.326
The youthfulness of a defendant is a factor that elicits jury
sympathy and accounts for some differences between judge and
jury decisions. 327 By contrast, juvenile court judges may be more
predisposed to find jurisdiction to help a troubled youth. 328 Finally, without a jury, judges adjudicate many delinquents without an attorney, which prejudices factfinding and increases the
likelihood of erroneous convictions.

322. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–39 (1978); see Guggenheim &
Hertz, supra note 303, at 578.
323. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 303, at 578.
324. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1167.
325. Id.
326. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 317, at 185–90.
327. Id. at 209–10.
328. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1166.
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Suppression Hearings and Evidentiary Contamination

In bench trials, judges typically conduct suppression hearings immediately before or during trial, a practice that exposes
them to inadmissible evidence and prejudicial information.329 A
judge may know about a youth’s prior delinquency from presiding at a detention hearing, prior adjudication, or trial of co-offenders. Similarly, a judge who suppresses an inadmissible confession or illegally seized evidence may still be influenced by it.
The presumption that exposure to inadmissible evidence will not
affect a judge is especially problematic where the same judge
typically handles a youth’s case at several different stages. An
adult defendant can avoid these risks by opting for a jury trial,
but delinquents have no way to avoid the cumulative risks of
prejudice in a bench trial. Critics of juvenile courts’ factfinding
conclude that “judges often convict on evidence so scant that only
the most closed-minded or misguided juror could think the evidence satisfied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 330 As a result, states adjudicate delinquents in cases in
which they could not have obtained convictions with adequate
procedural safeguards. 331 The differences between the factual reliability of delinquency adjudications and criminal convictions
raise questions about the use of juveniles’ records to enhance
criminal sentences.
b. Preventing Governmental Oppression and Get Tough
Policies
McKeiver uncritically assumed that juvenile courts treated
delinquents rather than punished them, but it did not review
any record to support that assumption. The Court did not analyze the indicia of treatment or punishment—juvenile code purpose clauses, sentencing statutes, judges’ sentencing practices,
conditions of confinement, or intervention outcomes—when it
denied delinquents a jury.
The Court long has recognized that juries serve a special
role to prevent governmental oppression and protect citizens facing punishment. 332 In our system of checks and balances, lay cit-

329. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 231–41;
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 303, at 571.
330. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 303, at 564–65.
331. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 29, at 231–41;
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 303, at 564–65, 571.
332. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 554 (1971).

536

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:473

izen jurors represent the ultimate restraint on abuses of governmental power, which is why it is the only procedural safeguard
listed in three different places in the constitution. 333 Duncan v.
Louisiana, decided three years before McKeiver, held that the
Sixth Amendment guaranteed a jury right in state criminal proceedings to assure accurate factfinding and to prevent governmental oppression.334 Duncan emphasized that juries inject community values into the law, increase visibility of justice
administration, and check abuses by prosecutors and judges. 335
The year after Duncan, Baldwin v. New York again emphasized
the jury’s role to prevent government oppression by interposing
lay citizens between the State and the defendant.336 Baldwin is
especially critical for juvenile justice because an adult charged
with any offense that carries a potential sentence of confinement
of six months or longer enjoys a right to a jury trial. 337
McKeiver feared that granting delinquents jury trials would
also lead to public trials. 338 However, as a result of Get Tough
Era reforms to increase the visibility, accountability, and punishment powers of juvenile courts, about half the states authorized public access to all delinquency proceedings or to felony
prosecutions.339 States limited confidentiality protections to hold
youths accountable and put the public on notice of those who
pose risks to the community. 340
i.

Punitive Juvenile Justice

The vast majority of states deny delinquents the right to a
jury 341 and youths have challenged McKeiver’s half-century old

333. See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 2.; id. amends. VI, VII.
334. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968).
335. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
336. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1969) (“[T]he primary purpose
of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by the Government; the
jury interposes between the accused and his accuser the judgment of laymen
who are less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel of judges, but who at the
same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Government that has proceeded against him.”); Duncan, 391 U.S. 145.
337. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73–74.
338. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
339. TORBET ET AL., supra note 48, at 36.
340. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 81.
341. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1190; Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 49 n.252.
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rationale in light of Get Tough Era changes.342 Most state appellate courts have rejected their claims with deeply flawed, uncritical analyses, which often conflate treatment with punishment. 343 Few courts engage in the careful analysis of purpose
clauses, sentencing statutes, judicial practices, and conditions of
confinement required to distinguish treatment from punishment. 344 States rejected juveniles’ challenges to Get Tough Era
changes—open hearings, mandatory sentences, and the use of
delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences—by emphasizing differences in the severity of penalties imposed on delinquents and criminal defendants convicted of the same
crime.345 However, once a penalty crosses Baldwin’s six-month
authorized sentence threshold, further severity is irrelevant. By
contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court in In re L.M. concluded that
legislative changes eroded the benevolent parens patriae character of juvenile courts and transformed it into a system for prosecuting juveniles charged with committing crimes. 346
c. Delinquency Convictions to Enhance Criminal Sentences
Apprendi v. New Jersey ruled that “any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” other than the fact of a prior conviction, “must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 347 The
Court exempted the “fact of a prior conviction” because criminal
defendants enjoyed the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a
342. McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528; see In re D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 30–35 (La. 2002)
(rejecting the juveniles’ argument that the policy-based analysis in McKeiver is
outdated, specifically in light of recent changes in state law and ongoing national critique of the juvenile justice system); In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467, 471 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (“As appellants correctly point out, the juvenile justice system
has undergone a transformation over the past two decades in which there has
been a move away from the rehabilitation and protection of juvenile offenders
toward more punishment and correctional oriented policies. Nonetheless, we
cannot conclude that a juvenile adjudication has, in essence, become the equivalent of an adult criminal proceeding.”); State v. Hezzie R. (In re Hezzie R.), 580
N.W.2d 660, 667–68 (Wis. 1998) (rejecting the juveniles’ argument that Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice Code is criminal in nature and thus McKeiver’s rationale
is inapposite).
343. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 46, at 50–51.
344. See In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467; In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660.
345. See In re D.J., 817 So. 2d at 33 (arguing that the juvenile would face a
maximum of eight years of detention if found delinquent while an adult convicted of the same charge could receive a maximum of fifty-five years imprisonment at hard labor).
346. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008).
347. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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reasonable doubt, which assured reliability of prior convictions. 348 Apprendi emphasized the jury’s role to uphold Winship’s standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.349 While
McKeiver approved jury-free delinquency proceedings to impose
rehabilitative dispositions, they would not be adequate to punish
a youth.
Juvenile courts historically restricted access to records to
avoid stigmatizing youths. 350 Criminal courts lacked access to
delinquency records because of juvenile courts’ confidentiality,
practice of sealing or expunging delinquency records, physical
separation of juvenile and criminal court staff and records, and
the difficulty of maintaining systems to track offenders and compile histories across both systems. 351 But criminal courts need to
know which juveniles’ delinquent careers continue into adulthood to incapacitate them, punish them, or protect public
safety. 352 Therefore, despite a tradition of confidentiality, states
have long used some delinquency convictions. Some states use
juvenile records on a discretionary basis. 353 Many state and federal sentencing guidelines include some delinquency convictions
in defendants’ criminal history score, 354 although some vary in
how they weigh delinquency convictions. 355
As a matter of policy, however, states should not equate delinquency and criminal convictions for sentence enhancements.
Despite causing the same physical injury or property loss as
older actors, juveniles’ reduced culpability makes their choices
less blameworthy and should diminish their weight. 356 Moreover, their use to enhance criminal sentences raises questions
about the procedures used to obtain those convictions. Juvenile
courts in many states adjudicate half or more delinquents without counsel.357 The vast majority of states deny juveniles the
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id.; see Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1120–24.
Appredni, 530 U.S. at 483–84.
FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 233–35.
Id.
Id.; James B. Jacobs, Juvenile Criminal Record Confidentiality, in
CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 106, at
149, 155.
353. See Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1184–88.
354. Id. at 1184–85; see United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
355. For example, under California’s three strikes law, some juvenile felony
convictions count as strikes for sentence enhancements. Feld, Constitutional
Tension, supra note 17 at 1187–88.
356. See infra Part II.B.
357. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 128.
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right to a jury trial. 358 Because some judges in bench trials may
apply Winship’s reasonable doubt standard less stringently,
more youths are convicted than would be with adequate safeguards.
Federal circuits are divided whether Apprendi allows judges
to use delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences. 359
State appellate court rulings reflect the federal split of opinion

358. Id. at 158.
359. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Tighe reasoned that delinquency adjudication does not fall
within the prior conviction exception. 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001). Tighe
explains:
[T]he “prior conviction” exception to Apprendi’s general rule must be
limited to prior convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Juvenile adjudications that do not afford the right to a
jury trial and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof, therefore,
do not fall within Apprendi’s ‘prior conviction’ exception.
Id.
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Smalley reasoned that
Apprendi excepted prior convictions from its general rule because the procedural safeguards of trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt assured
their reliability. 294 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002). While Apprendi identified
those procedural safeguards that clearly established the reliability of prior convictions—notice, right to a jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt—it
did not hold that they were essential prerequisites to a valid conviction. 530
U.S. at 476–78. The court in Smalley reasoned:
We think that while the Court established what constitutes sufficient
procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings under a lesser
[preponderance] standard of proof ), the Court did not take a position
on possibilities that lie in between these two poles. In other words, we
think that it is incorrect to assume that it is not only sufficient but
necessary that the “fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections” . . . underly [sic] an adjudication before it can qualify for the Apprendi exemption.
Smalley, 294 F.3d. at 1032.
Rather than focusing on the specific procedural safeguards of a criminal
prosecution, Smalley focused on “whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption.” Id. at 1033. The court reviewed the procedural safeguards available
to juveniles as a result of Gault and Winship and concluded that “these safeguards are more than sufficient to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires.” Id. at 1033. The court reiterated McKeiver ’s assertion that the absence
of a jury would not detract from the accuracy of factfinding in delinquency adjudications. Id. However, Smalley did not examine McKeiver ’s “treatment” rationale for less stringent procedural safeguards or the inconsistency of using
convictions obtained for a benign purpose subsequently to be used for a more
punitive one. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1196–1222.
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about the reliability of delinquency convictions and the requirement for a jury right. 360 Until the Court clarifies Apprendi, defendants in some states or federal circuits will serve longer sentences than those in other jurisdictions based on flawed
delinquency convictions.
Finally, the use of delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences further aggravates endemic racial disparities in
justice administration. At each stage of the juvenile justice system, racial disparities compound, cumulate, create more extensive delinquency records, and contribute to disproportionate minority confinement. Richard Frase’s magisterial analysis of
racial disparities in criminal sentencing in Minnesota concludes
that “seemingly legitimate sentencing factors such as criminal
history scoring can have strongly disparate impacts on nonwhite
defendants.” 361
i.

Collateral Consequences of Delinquency Convictions

In addition to direct penalties—confinement and enhanced
sentences as juveniles or as adults—extensive collateral consequences follow from delinquency convictions. Although state policies vary, collateral consequences may follow youths for decades
and affect future housing, education, and employment opportunities.362 States may enter juveniles’ fingerprints, photographs,
and DNA into databases accessible to law enforcement and other
agencies.363 Some get-tough reforms opened delinquency trials
and records to the public, and media reports on the internet create a permanent and easily accessed record. 364 Criminal justice
agencies, schools, child care providers, the military, and others
may have access to juvenile court records automatically or by
petition. 365 Expungement of delinquency records is not automatic and requires a petition and court hearing. 366 Delinquency
convictions may affect youths’ ability to obtain professional licensure, to receive government aid, to join the military, to obtain
360. See State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d
1276 (La. 2004); Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 17, at 1203–14.
361. Richard Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in
Minnesota’s Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 265 (2009).
362. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 3; NELLIS, supra note
50, at 61.
363. See FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 29, at 369–76.
364. See NELLIS, supra note 50, at 69–73.
365. See id. at 63–65; Jacobs, supra note 352, at 161.
366. See NELLIS, supra note 50, at 63–65 (discussing the complex process for
juvenile record expungement).
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or keep legal immigration status, to live in public housing, and
more. 367
The response to juvenile sex offenders is among the most onerous collateral consequence of delinquency adjudication. 368 The
federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act—Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)—requires
states to implement registration and notification standards for
individuals convicted as adults or juveniles for certain sex offenses. 369 Some states require lifetime registration, limit where
registered offenders can live, work, or attend school, and require
neighborhood notification. 370
d. Conclusion
The procedural as well as substantive convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts since Gault has placed greater demands on juveniles’ competence to exercise rights. Despite
greater punitiveness and increased formality, most states do not
provide delinquents the formal or functional procedural protections afforded adults. Juveniles waive Miranda rights and counsel under an adult legal standard that many do not understand
and cannot meet. The denial of juries undermines the reliability
of delinquency convictions and their subsequent use for longterm collateral consequences.
State legislatures that define juvenile courts should recognize that “children are different,” and provide greater assistance.
Lawmakers passed punitive laws and simultaneously eroded juvenile courts’ meager protections—closed and confidential proceedings, limited collateral use of delinquency convictions, and
the like. Legislators failed to appropriate adequate funds for legal services and fostered crippled public defenders incapable of
providing effective assistance of counsel. A half-century after

367. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 127; see also NELLIS,
supra note 50, at 61.
368. See NELLIS, supra note 50, at 69–73. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING (2004) (discussing the societal and legal response to the juvenile sex
offender).
369. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16962 (2012); NELLIS, supra note 50, at 70–71.
370. See ZIMRING, supra note 368, at 147–50; see also Michael F. Caldwell,
Juvenile Sexual Offenders, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 55, 80 (discussing studies of registration laws, concluding that these laws impede “community reintegration of less resilient offenders, who are then rearrested more rapidly”).
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Gault, many juveniles in many states are still waiting for a lawyer to advocate on their behalf. 371
II. YOUTHS IN CRIMINAL COURT
A. TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT
During the Get Tough Era, lawmakers changed the theory
and practice of transfer and increased the numbers of youths
tried as adults. States use one or more often-overlapping transfer strategies: (1) judicial waiver; (2) legislative offense exclusion; and (3) prosecutorial direct-file. 372 For around 200,000
youths, states’ juvenile court jurisdiction ends at fifteen or sixteen, rather than seventeen years of age. 373 States transfer another 50,000 youths via judicial waiver (7500), prosecutorial direct-file (27,000), and the remainder with prosecutor-determined
excluded offenses. 374 We lack precise numbers because states
only collect data on judicial transfers, which account for the fewest number of youths waived. 375
During the Get Tough Era, legislators shifted control of
transfer decisions from judges to prosecutors to avoid the former’s relative autonomy from political pressures. 376 Legal
changes lowered the age for transfer, increased the numbers of
excluded offenses, and strengthened prosecutors’ charging powers. 377 Despite the prevalence of judicial waiver statutes, prosecutors’ excluded offenses or direct-file charging decisions determine the adult status of eighty-five percent of youths. 378
371. See generally NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 264 and accompanying text.
372. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 33, at 110; Barry C. Feld & Donna M.
Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 801, 802.
373. Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 815.
374. Id.
375. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 110.
376. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 207, 214–18; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 38–39.
377. Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 83, 126 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Feld, Legislative Exclusion].
378. Jolanta Juszkiewicz & Mark Schindler, Youth Crime/Adult Time: Is
Justice Served?, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2001, at 102; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2005) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL] (“[T]he proportion of children who have had a

2017]

COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY

543

The vast majority of states have judicial waiver laws that
specify the ages and offenses for which a judge may conduct a
transfer hearing.379 Kent v. United States required judges to conduct a procedurally fair hearing (counsel, access to probation reports, and written findings for appellate review) because the loss
of juvenile courts’ benefits (access to treatment, confidentiality,
limited collateral consequences, and the like) was a critical action.380 Breed v. Jones applied the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition to delinquency adjudications and required
states to decide whether to prosecute a youth in juvenile or criminal court before proceeding to trial.381 Kent appended a list of
factors for judges to consider and state courts and statutes incorporated those criteria. 382 Judges have broad discretion to interpret those factors and studies of judicial waiver document inconsistent rulings, justice by geography, and over-representation of
racial minorities. 383 For decades, studies reported racial disparities in judicial transfer decisions.384 Judges transfer minority
youths more often than white youths especially for violent and
drug crimes.385 In the seventy-five largest counties in the United
States, racial minorities comprised more than two-thirds of juveniles tried in criminal court and the vast majority of those sentenced to adult prison. 386
A dozen states set their juvenile courts’ age jurisdiction at
fifteen or sixteen years—rather than seventeen—for certain felonies, which results in the largest numbers of youths tried as
adults. 387 In addition, some states’ laws exclude youths sixteen
transfer hearing before being tried in criminal court has been steadily declining.”).
379. Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 802–05.
380. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
381. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
382. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–67.
383. See generally Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial
Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ.
73 (1995); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line:
An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449
(1996).
384. See, e.g., GAO, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL
COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS 59 (1995); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 378, at 39 (“[M]inority youths receive harsher treatment than similarly situated white youths at every stage of the criminal justice system.”).
385. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 216; POE-YAMAGATA &
JONES, supra note 57, at 12–14.
386. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 220.
387. Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 806, 809–10.

544

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:473

or older charged with murder, while others exclude more extensive lists of offenses.388 During the Get Tough Era, many states
excluded more offenses—crimes against the person, property,
drugs, or weapons offenses—to evade Kent’s hearing requirement. 389 Appellate courts uniformly reject youths’ claims that
prosecuting them for an excluded offense denies Kent’s procedural safeguards.390
In more than a dozen states, juvenile and criminal courts
share concurrent jurisdiction over some ages and offenses—older
youths and serious crimes—and prosecutors decide through direct file in which forum to charge a youth.391 Under offense exclusion, the crime charged determines the venue; direct-file laws
allow prosecutors to select either system to try the crime. 392 Direct file elevates prosecutors’ power at judges’ expense and creates a model more typical of criminal courts. Most direct-file laws
provide no criteria to guide prosecutors’ choice of forum.393 Prosecutors lack access to personal, social, or clinical information
about a youth that a judge would consider and base their decisions primarily on police reports.394 Locally elected prosecutors
exploit crime issues just as get-tough legislators do, introduce
justice by geography and racial disparities, and exercise their
discretion as subjectively as do judges, but without appellate review. Nationally, prosecutors have determined the criminal status of eighty-five percent of youths tried as adults 395 and have
acted as gatekeepers to the juvenile justice system, a role previously reserved for judges—who have more experience, information, and less political motivations.
Another Get Tough Era innovation was blended sentences,
which provide judges with mixed juvenile-criminal sentencing
options. 396 Because juvenile courts lose jurisdiction when youths
reach the age of majority or other dispositional age limit, judges
388. Id. at 809–10.
389. See id. at 806.
390. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1972).
391. See Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 377 at 98–101; Feld &
Bishop, supra note 372, at 819.
392. See Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 819.
393. Id. at 820.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 821.
396. Id. at 806. See generally Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld,
The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform, “Blended Sentencing,” and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001) (examining the net-widening impact of blended sentencing policies).
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may be unable to sentence appropriately older offenders convicted of serious crimes. States increase judges’ sentencing powers by allowing juvenile courts to impose extended delinquency
sentences with a stayed criminal sentence, or by giving criminal
courts authority to use a delinquency disposition in lieu of imprisonment. 397 Regardless of approach, blended sentencing laws
require criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to a
jury trial, to enable a judge to punish and thereby gain greater
flexibility to treat. 398 Although states adopted blended sentences
as an alternative to transfer, they had a net-widening effect, and
juvenile court judges frequently impose them on less-serious offenders whom they previously handled as delinquents.399 Judges
have imposed blended sentences on younger, less-serious offenders, have subsequently revoked their probation—primarily for
technical violations—and have doubled the number of youths
sent to prison. 400 Prosecutors have used the threat of transfer to
coerce youths to plead to blended sentences, to waive procedural
rights, to increase punishment imposed in juvenile courts, and
to risk exposure to criminal sanctions.401
1. Juveniles in Prison
Criminal court judges sentence transferred youths like
adults, which increases their likelihood of subsequent offending. 402 While all inmates potentially face abuse, adolescents’
size, physical strength, lesser social skills, and lack of sophistication increase their risk for physical, sexual, and psychological
victimization. 403 To prevent victimization, some states place vulnerable youths in solitary confinement for twenty-two hours a
day.404 Prisons are developmentally inappropriate places for
youths to form an identity, acquire social skills, or make a suc-

397. See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 396, at 999.
398. Id. at 1009.
399. Id. at 1028, 1071.
400. See id. at 1063, 1070.
401. See id. at 1003, 1029–30.
402. See Feld & Bishop, supra note 372, at 828.
403. See Michele Deitch & Neelum Arya, Waivers and Transfers of Juveniles
to Adult Court: Treating Juveniles Like Adult Criminals, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
SOURCEBOOK 241, 252 (Wesley T. Church II et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014); Edward P.
Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Youth in Prison and Beyond, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 843,
846–48.
404. Deitch & Arya, supra note 403, at 252–53.
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cessful transition to adulthood. Imprisoning them exacts different and greater developmental opportunity costs than those experienced by adults. 405 It disrupts normal development—completing education, finding a job, forming relationships and
creating social bonds that promote desistance—and ground lost
may never be regained.
2. Policy Justifications for Waiver: Unarticulated and
Unrealized
States will prosecute some youths in criminal court as a
matter of public safety and political reality. Legislative changes
that targeted violent and drug crimes increased the likelihood
and severity of criminal sentences; judges incarcerate transferred youths more often and for longer sentences than youths
retained in juvenile courts. 406 Although approximately threequarters of youths convicted of violent felonies in criminal court
go to prison, overall nearly half of all transferred youths are not
convicted or placed on probation, fewer than twenty-five percent
are sentenced to prison, and ninety-five percent are released
from custody by their twenty-fifth birthday.407
Although legislators assumed that threat of transfer and
criminal punishment would deter youths, studies of juvenile
crime rates before and after passage of get tough laws found no
general deterrent effect. 408 Studies of specific deterrence report
that transferred youths had higher recidivism rates than did
those sentenced as delinquents.409 Studies compared outcomes
405. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 135.
406. See Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent
to Delinquency?, JUV. JUST. BULL., June 2010, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/220595.pdf; MALCOLM C. YOUNG & JENNI GAINSBOROUGH, PROSECUTING
JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES
9 (2000), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/juvenile.pdf.
407. Deitch & Arya, supra note 403, at 251; Carol A. Schubert et al., Predicting Outcomes for Youth Transferred to Adult Court, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 460,
468 (2010).
408. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 122. See generally Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative Effects of State Direct File
Waiver Laws on Violent Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1451 (2006) (concluding that direct file laws do not deter
juvenile crime); Benjamin Steiner et al., Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent Effects of Statutory Exclusion Laws Enacted Post-1979, 23 JUST.
Q. 34 (2006) (finding that excluded offense laws do not deter young offenders).
409. See generally Redding, supra note 406 (exploring the effects of juvenile
transfer mechanisms); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: Legal Sanctions and Public Safety Among Adolescent Felony Offenders in Juvenile
and Criminal Court (Columbia Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 03-61,
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of youths transferred to criminal courts with those who remained in juvenile courts and concluded that youths tried as
adults had higher and faster recidivism rates, especially for violent crimes, than their delinquent counterparts. 410
Although judges do not imprison all transferred youths, they
sometimes treat youthfulness as an aggravating rather than a
mitigating factor when they do. Prior to Miller v. Alabama, more
youths convicted of murder received life without parole (LWOP)
sentences than did adults sentenced for murder. 411 Compared
with young adult offenders, transferred juveniles convicted of
the same crimes often received longer sentences. 412
Punitive transfer laws have targeted violent crimes, which
black youths commit more often. 413 Even prior to the Get Tough
Era, studies reported racial disparities in judicial transfer decisions.414 Subsequently, judges transferred youths of color more
often than white youths charged with similar violent and drug
crimes. 415 The vast majority of juveniles transferred to criminal
court and sentenced to prison are youths of color, primarily black
youths. 416
3. Waiver Policy: What Should a Rational Legislature Do?
Expansive transfer policies further no legitimate penal
goals. Equating younger and older offenders ignores developmental differences and disproportionately punishes less blameworthy adolescents. Transfer does not deter youths because their
2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=491202.
410. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE OF LAWS AND POLICIES FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM THE JUVENILE TO THE ADULT JUSTICE
SYSTEM 7 (2007), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5609.pdf; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 175.
411. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 121.
412. Megan Kurlychek & Brian D. Johnson, The Juvenile Penalty: A Comparison of Juvenile and Young Adult Sentencing Outcomes in Criminal Court,
42 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 500–02 (2004). See generally Megan Kurlychek & Brian
D. Johnson, Juvenility and Punishment: Sentencing Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 725 (2010) [hereinafter Kurlychek & Johnson, Juvenility and Punishment].
413. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 216; POE-YAMAGATA
& JONES, supra note 57, at 12–14.
414. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 122.
415. See Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 48, at 194–95; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 216, 250; POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra
note 57, at 17.
416. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 220.
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immature judgment, short-term time perspective, and preference for immediate gains lessen the threat of sanctions. Youths
tried as adults reoffend more quickly and more seriously,
thereby increasing the risk to public safety and negating any
short-term crime reduction by incapacitation.417
The vast majority of juvenile justice scholars agree that if
some youths must be transferred, then it should occur in a judicial waiver process and be used rarely.418 A state should waive
only those youths whose serious and persistent offenses require
minimum lengths of confinement that greatly exceed the maximum sanctions available in juvenile court. A retributive policy
would limit severe sanctions to youths charged with homicide,
rape, robbery or assault with a firearm or substantial injury.
However, severely punishing all youths who commit serious
crimes would be counterproductive because youths arrested for
an initial violent offense desist at similar rates to other delinquents.419 Chronic offenders may require sentences longer than
those available in juvenile court because of persistent criminality and exhaustion of juvenile court resources.420
A legislature should prescribe a minimum age of eligibility
for criminal prosecution. Developmental psychological and neuroscience research reports a sharp drop-off in judgment, self-control, and appreciation of consequences as well as in competence
to exercise procedural rights for youths fifteen years of age or
younger. 421 The minimum age for transfer should be sixteen
years of age.
A juvenile court hearing (1) guided by offense criteria and
clinical considerations; and (2) subject to rigorous appellate review is the only sensible way to make transfer decisions. 422 Cri-

417. See FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 122.
418. See id. at 122–23; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 242–43; ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 125–27; Donna Bishop, Injustice and Irrationality in
Contemporary Youth Policy, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 633, 640 (2004); Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes,
18 FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2008, at 108.
419. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 23–25; MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 251, 254 (1972); Alex R. Piquero
et al., Criminal Career Patterns, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT
CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 85,
at 14, 24.
420. Feld, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 123.
421. See supra notes 166–81, 223–29, 273–76; infra notes 457–87 and accompanying text.
422. See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 210; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra
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teria should focus on violent offenses, prior record, offender culpability, criminal participation, clinical evaluations, and aggravating and mitigating factors which, taken together, distinguish
youths who deserve sentences substantially longer than those
juvenile courts can impose. Appellate courts should closely review waiver decisions and develop substantive principles to define a consistent boundary of adulthood. Although waiver hearings are less efficient than prosecutors’ charging decisions, it
should be difficult to transfer youths—juvenile courts exist to
keep them out of the criminal justice system. An adversarial
hearing at which prosecution and defense present evidence
about offense, culpability, and treatment prognoses will produce
better decisions than will politically-motivated prosecutors acting without clinical information.
B. SENTENCING YOUTHS AS ADULTS: CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT
The Supreme Court developed its jurisprudence of youth—
children are different—in response to punitive laws that ignored
adolescents’ reduced culpability. It was a judicial assertion that
enough is enough. In a trilogy of cases beginning in 2005, the
Court applied the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment to juveniles. 423 Roper v. Simmons prohibited states from executing offenders for murder committed before they were eighteen years of age.424 The Justices concluded
that youths’ immature judgment and lack of self-control, susceptibility to negative peers, and transitory personalities reduced
their culpability and precluded the most severe sentence. 425 Graham v. Florida extended Roper’s diminished-responsibility rationale and prohibited states from imposing LWOP sentences on
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 426 It repudiated the
Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrine that “death is different.” 427
note 1, at 244–45; Bishop, supra note 418; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence,
supra note 48, at 205–06; cf. ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 125–27 (arguing that
transfer decisions should be made by judges rather than prosecutors).
423. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth
Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Adolescent Criminal
Responsibility] (explaining these cases’ impact on juvenile criminal law); Barry
C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young To Do
the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Youth Discount]
(tracing the effects of these three cases).
424. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
425. Id. at 569–70.
426. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70–73, (2015).
427. Id. at 74 (majority opinion); id. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Miller v. Alabama extended Roper and Graham’s diminished-responsibility rationale and barred mandatory LWOP sentences
for youths convicted of murder. 428 Miller required judges to make
individualized culpability assessments and to weigh youthfulness as a mitigating factor. 429
Despite the Court’s repeated assertions that children are
different, Graham provided nonhomicide juvenile offenders very
limited relief—“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release” 430—without requiring either rehabilitative services or
eventual freedom. Miller required a judge to make an individualized assessment of a juvenile murderer’s culpability, but did
not preclude a LWOP sentence. 431 State courts and legislatures
have struggled to implement juveniles’ diminished responsibility
when sentencing them as adults. 432
The increased numbers and immaturity of many juveniles
sentenced as adults impelled the Court to review states’ criminal
sentencing laws as applied to children. Roper held that youths
are categorically less criminally responsible than adults. 433 Graham rejected the Court’s death is different jurisprudence and reformulated the Court’s proportionality analyses to account for
the doubly diminished responsibility of juveniles who did not
kill.434 Miller barred mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles
who murder and relied on death-penalty precedents to require
individualized assessments and to weigh youths’ diminished responsibility. 435 State courts and legislatures have struggled unsuccessfully to implement the Court’s children are different jurisprudence because the opinions’ broad language provides scant
guidance on several critical questions. This Section concludes by
proposing a youth discount—shorter sentences for younger offenders—to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor.
As noted above, states annually try upwards of 200,000
428. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
429. Id. at 481, 489.
430. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
431. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
432. See infra notes 515–24 and accompanying text. See generally Cara H.
Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1816–18 (2016) (reviewing state responses to Miller); Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the
Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 975–76 (2015)
(describing how states have reformulated sentencing schemes after Miller).
433. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
434. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72.
435. Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–79.
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chronological juveniles as adults. 436 The fallacious predictions
during the Get Tough Era of an impending bloodbath by superpredators propelled punitive policies.437 States lowered the age
for transfer, increased the number of excluded offenses, and
shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors, all of which exacerbated racial disparities. 438 Racial stereotypes taint culpability
assessments and reduce youthfulness’ mitigating role.439 Children of color comprise the majority of juveniles tried in criminal
court and three-quarters of those who enter prison.440 For adults,
states’ Get Tough Era criminal laws lengthened sentences,
adopted mandatory minimums, and imposed mandatory LWOP
sentences for homicide and other crimes. 441 The laws applied
equally to juveniles as to adults; judges sentenced them as if they
were adults and sent them to the same prisons.
1. Roper v. Simmons: Banning the Death Penalty for
Juveniles
The Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting
cruel and unusual punishments. 442 Prior to Roper v. Simmons,
the Court thrice considered whether it prohibited states from executing juveniles convicted of murder.443 Before Roper in 1989,
436. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 57, at 13.
437. See WILLIAM BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY. . . AND
HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 21–34 (1996) (warning of ominous impending crime wave by young people); ZIMRING, supra note
23, at 11–16; Zimring, supra note 28, at 265.
438. C.f. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 42 (explaining that
these reforms made minority youth “[receive] disproportionately harsh treatment in many states”).
439. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments in Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 561 (1998); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery,
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 483, 494 (2004); Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice, Media,
Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 853–54 (2010).
440. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 57, at 2, 25; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 39–43.
441. See TONRY, supra note 61, at 170; MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, 146–47 (1996).
442. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
443. Earlier decisions adverted to the importance of considering youthfulness as a mitigating factor in capital sentencing. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822–23 (1988) (plurality opinion) (concluding that fifteenyear-old offenders lacked culpability to warrant execution); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (remanding a sixteen-year-old defendant for
resentencing after the trial court’s failure to properly consider youthfulness as
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Stanford v. Kentucky upheld the death penalty for sixteen- or
seventeen-year-olds convicted of murder and allowed juries to
assess their personal culpability on a case-by-case basis.444 Finally, in 2005, Roper overruled Stanford and prohibited states
from executing youths for crimes committed prior to age eighteen. 445
Roper gave three reasons why states could not punish juveniles as severely as adults. First, their immature judgment and
limited self-control causes them to act impulsively and without
adequate appreciation of consequences.446 Second, their susceptibility to negative peers and inability to escape criminogenic environments reduce their responsibility. 447 Third, their transitory
personality provides less reliable evidence of enduring blameworthiness. 448 Because juveniles’ character is transitional, the
a mitigating factor and noting that “youth is more than a chronological fact” and
“minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults”). Thompson’s proportionality analysis considered both objective factors—state statutes, jury practices, and the views of organizations and
the international community—and the Justices’ own subjective sense of “civilized standards of decency.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823, 830–31. Thompson emphasized that deserved punishment must reflect individual culpability and concluded that “[t]here is also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents
as a class are less mature and responsible than adults.” Id. at 834.
444. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374–77 (1989) (acknowledging that
most juveniles were less criminally responsible than adults, but rejecting a categorical ban and allowing juries to decide whether a youth’s culpability warranted execution).
445. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Roper relied on the analytic methodology the Court used earlier in Atkins v. Virginia to bar execution
of defendants with mental retardation. See id. at 563–67; Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring states from executing defendants with mental
retardation). Atkins found a national consensus existed because many states
barred the practice and few states actually executed offenders with mental retardation. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16 (counting state statutes and emphasizing
that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change” that enabled the Court to find the existence of a national consensus). The Atkins Justices’ independent proportionality
analysis concluded that mentally impaired defendants lacked the culpability to
warrant execution. Id. at 315–19.
446. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. (“[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often that in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions.”) (internal citation omitted).
447. Id. at 569 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”). The Court explained, “ Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.”
Id. at 570.
448. Id. (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
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Court concluded that there is a great likelihood that they can be
reformed. 449 For Roper, youths’ diminished responsibility undermined retributive justifications for the death penalty.450 Similarly, the Court concluded that impulsiveness and limited selfcontrol weakened any deterrent effect.451 Roper imposed a categorical ban rather than allowing juries to evaluate youths’ culpability individually because the “unacceptable likelihood exists
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime
would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a
sentence less severe than death.” 452 Because a brutal murder
could overwhelm the mitigating role of youthfulness, Roper used
age as a categorical proxy for reduced culpability.
Roper reasoned that immature judgment, susceptibility to

adult.”). Because juveniles’ character is transitional, “[f ]rom a moral standpoint
it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult,
for a greater possibility exists that a minor ’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 571. Roper noted the two penal functions served by the death
penalty—retribution and deterrence—and concluded that:
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim,
the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.
Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.
Id.
451. Id. The Court concluded that juveniles’ immature judgment decreased
the likelihood that the threat of execution would deter them, explaining that
“the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because the
same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as
well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id.
452. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis added). Clinicians do not diagnose people
younger than eighteen with antisocial personality disorder, and Roper declined
to allow jurors to make culpability assessments that clinicians eschew. Id. at
573 (noting that psychologists cannot differentiate between a transiently immature juvenile and the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption”). The Court feared that a brutal murder could overwhelm the mitigating role of youthfulness. Id.; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth:
Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 83 (2005)
(arguing that “to the extent we see or want to see childhood as a time of innocence, cognitive dissonance may prompt us to reconceive a child who does terrible things as an adult”). See generally, Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility,
supra note 423 (tracing the Court’s jurisprudence on youth as a mitigating factor); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423 (advocating a categorical rule of mitigation based on offenders’ youth).
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peer and environmental influences, and transitional personalities reduced adolescents’ criminal responsibility. 453 Roper—and
subsequently Graham and Miller—analyzed youths’ reduced
culpability within a retributive sentencing framework: proportionality and deserved punishment. Retributive sentencing proportions punishment to a crime’s seriousness. 454 A crime’s seriousness is defined by two elements, harm and culpability, which
determine how much punishment an actor deserves. An offender’s age has no bearing on the harm caused—children and
adults can cause the same injuries. But proportionality requires
consideration of an offender’s culpability, and immaturity reduces youths’ blameworthiness. 455 Youths’ inability to fully appreciate wrongfulness or to control themselves lessens, but does
453. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
454. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 161 (2009) (arguing that “the offender ’s blameworthiness for an offense
is generally assessed according to two elements: the nature and seriousness of
the harm foreseeably caused or threatened by the crime and the offender ’s culpability in committing the crime (in particular, the offender ’s degree of intent
(mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other diminished
capacity”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48 (1976) (“[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his
conduct was wrong and that he is blameworthy for having committed it.”). According to Professor Frase:
[T]he degree of blameworthiness of an offense is generally assessed according to two kinds of elements: the nature and seriousness of the
harm caused or threatened by the crime; and the offender ’s degree of
culpability in committing the crime, in particular, his or her degree of
intent (mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or
other diminished capacity.
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590
(2005).
455. Offender culpability is central to proportional sentencing. See Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (reasoning that “[d]eeply engrained in our
legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is [sic] the criminal conduct,
the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be
punished”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence] (“[Adolescents’] criminal choices are presumed less to express individual preferences and more to reflect the behavioral influences characteristic of a
transitory developmental stage that are generally shared with others in the age
cohort. This difference supports drawing a line based on age, and subjecting
adolescents to a categorical presumption of reduced responsibility.”); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 389, 407–09 (1999) (explaining that youths lack “ability to control

2017]

COMPETENCE AND CULPABILITY

555

not excuse, responsibility for causing harms. They may have the
minimum capacity to be criminally liable, that is, the ability to
distinguish right from wrong, but still deserve less punishment. 456
a. Developmental Psychology, Neuroscience, and Diminished
Responsibility
Developmental psychology focuses on how children and adolescents’ thinking and behavior change with age. 457 By mid-adolescence, most youths reason similarly to adults, such as when,
for example, they make informed-consent medical decisions. 458
But the ability to make reasonable decisions with complete information under laboratory conditions differs from the ability to
act responsibly under stress with incomplete information. Emotions influence youths’ judgment to a greater extent than adults

[their] impulses, to manage [their] behavior in the face of pressure from others
to violate the law, or to extricate [themselves] from a potentially problematic
situation,” and that these deficiencies render them less blameworthy). Franklin
Zimring uses the term “diminished responsibility” to refer to adolescents who
possess “the minimum abilities for blameworthiness and thus for punishment . . . [whose] immaturity . . . still suggests that less punishment is justified.” Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes
on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL:
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 271,
273 [hereinafter Zimring, Penal Proportionality]; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 1 at 123–24; ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 75 (arguing that “even after
a youth passes the minimum threshold of competence, this barely competent
youth is not as culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully qualified adult offender ”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 830 (2003) [hereinafter Scott &
Steinberg, Blaming Youth] (arguing that compared with adults, youths act more
impulsively, weigh consequences differently from adults, and discount risks because of normal developmental processes that “undermine [their] decision-making capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability”).
456. Zimring, Penal Proportionality, supra note 455, at 278; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 122 (“[C]riminal law calculates culpability and punishment on a continuum and is not limited to the options of full responsibility (the
presumption for typical adult offenders) or excuse (the disposition of children).”).
457. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENT RISK-TAKING: WORKSHOP REPORT 48–49 (2011).
458. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 95 (“Adolescents are
similar to adults in their reasoning and abstract thinking abilities.”); Stephen
J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,
52–53 (1997) (concluding that the cognitive capacity and formal reasoning ability of mid-adolescents does not differ significantly from that of adults).
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and compromise adolescents’ decision-making and self-control. 459 Youths are more heavily influenced by the reward centers
of the brain, which contributes to riskier decisions. 460
In response to states’ adoption of punitive laws, in 1997 the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation sponsored the
Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice (ADJJ). Over the next decade, the ADJJ network conducted research on adolescent decision-making, judgment, and
adjudicative competence. 461 The research distinguishes between
cognitive abilities, judgment, and self-control: controlled thinking versus impulsive behaving. 462 Cognitive capacities involve
understanding, the ability to comprehend information, and reasoning, the ability to use information logically. 463 Self-control requires the ability to think before acting, to choose between alternatives, and to interrupt a course in motion.464 Although sixteenyear-olds’ understanding and reasoning approximate adults,
their ability to exercise mature judgment and control impulses
takes several more years to emerge. 465
Youths differ from adults in risk perception, appreciation of
consequences, impulsivity and self-control, sensation-seeking,
and compliance with peers. 466 The regions of the brain that control reward-seeking and emotional arousal develop earlier than

459. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 39;
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 91; LINDA PATIA SPEAR, THE BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE 139–40 (2010); Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001).
460. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 40;
Dahl, supra note 459, at 62.
461. See, e.g., NELLIS, supra note 50, at 79–82; MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE JUSTICE, Development
and Criminal Blameworthiness (2006), https://www.adjj.org/downloads/
3030PPT-%20Adolescent%20Development%20and%20Criminal%20
Blameworthiness.pdf.
462. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 131–33, 136–38; Jennifer L.
Woolard, Adolescent Development, Delinquency, and Juvenile Justice, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 38,
at 107, 107–08.
463. See Woolard, supra note 462, at 107–10.
464. Id. at 108.
465. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 36–37; LAURENCE STEINBERG,
AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE 69
(2014); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 813.
466. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 2; SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at 37–44; Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423, at 115–17.
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do those that regulate executive functions and impulse control. 467 Adolescents underestimate the amount and likelihood of
risks, emphasize immediate outcomes, focus on anticipated
gains rather than possible losses to a greater extent than adults,
and consider fewer options. 468 They weigh costs and benefits differently, apply dissimilar subjective values to outcomes, and
more heavily discount negative future consequences than more
immediate rewards.469 They have less experience and knowledge
to inform decisions about consequences. They prefer an immediate, albeit smaller, reward than do adults, who can better delay
gratification. 470 In a risk-benefit calculus, youths may view not
engaging in risky behaviors differently than adults. 471 Researchers attribute youths’ impetuous decisions to a heightened appetite for emotional arousal and intense experiences, which peaks
around sixteen or seventeen years of age. 472
Neuroscience research reports that the human brain continues to mature until the early to mid-twenties. Adolescents on average do not have adults’ neurobiological capacity to exercise mature judgment or control impulses.473 The relationship between

467. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 48.
468. See SPEAR, supra note 459, at 137–39; Woolard, supra note 462, at 109–
10.
469. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 54–56;
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD., (Fall 2008), at 15, 20 (suggesting
that because youths assess and weigh risks differently than adults, they are less
likely to anticipate that someone might get hurt or killed in the commission of
a felony); Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons
from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 291, 304–05 (“Adolescents,
perhaps because they have less knowledge and experience, are less aware of
risks than are adults. . . . [T]he fact that adolescents have less experience and
knowledge than adults seems likely to affect their decision making in tangible
and intangible ways.”).
470. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 91, 93.
471. Barry C. Feld et al., Adolescent Competence and Culpability: Implications of Neuroscience for Juvenile Justice Administration, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 179, 188 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies
eds., 2013); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 42; INST. OF MED. &
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 50; Scott & Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, supra note 455, at 814–15.
472. See Feld et al., supra note 471, at 186–88; INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 42; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
1, at 91–93; SPEAR, supra note 459, at 140–41.
473. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 96–100 (citing studies
showing the difference in adolescent brain function relative to adults, including
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two brain regions—the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the limbic
system—underlie youths’ propensity for risky behavior. 474 The
PFC is responsible for judgment and impulse control. 475 The
amygdala and limbic system regulate emotional arousal and reward-seeking behavior. 476 The PFC performs executive functions: reasoning, planning, and impulse control.477 These topthe ability to exercise self-control). See generally SPEAR, supra note 459 (explaining how neurobiological developments in the brain affect how adolescents
think and behave).
474. Dahl, supra note 459, at 69 (“Regions in the PFC that underpin higher
cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing functional changes that
continue well into late adolescence/adulthood.”). While summarizing research
on brain development and its implications for adolescent self-control, Scott &
Steinberg note:
[R]egions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning,
regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and
reward continue to mature over the course of adolescence, and perhaps
well into young adulthood. At puberty, changes in the limbic system—
a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of
emotion—may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty
and to take more risks; these changes also may contribute to increased
emotionality and vulnerability to stress. At the same time, patterns of
development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active during the performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decision-making,
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature
well into middle adolescence.
Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 816. See also Laurence
Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010) [hereinafter Steinberg, Dual Systems] (reviewing the “neurobiological evidence for changes in brain structure and function during adolescence and early adulthood that facilitate improvements in
self-regulation”). See generally Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg, Social Neuroscience] (analyzing how changes in the brain
during adolescence are related to a decline in risk-taking behavior).
475. Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 816.
476. Feld et al., supra note 471, at 191 (identifying the amygdala and limbic
system as the parts of the brain that govern desire and emotion); Steinberg,
Social Neuroscience, supra note 474, at 95 (linking maturity in the prefrontal
cortex to improved emotional regulation and cognitive control).
477. The prefrontal cortex operates as the CEO of the brain and controls
planning, goal-directed responses, risk assessment, and impulse control.
ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 144 (2001); see also B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional
Brain Development and Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 241, 244 (2000) [hereinafter Casey et al., Structural and Functional]
(associating the PFC with a variety of cognitive abilities and behavior control);
B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI., March
2008 at 111, 112 (reporting that the brain’s ability to control behavior continues
to mature through late adolescence); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. YurgelunTodd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 321, 323 (2006) (“ The frontal cortex has been shown to play a major
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down capabilities develop gradually and enable individuals to
exercise greater self-control. 478
During adolescence, two neurobiological processes—myelination and synaptic pruning—enhance the PFC’s functions. 479
Myelin is a white fatty substance that forms a sheath around
neural axons, facilitates more efficient neurotransmission, and
makes communication between different brain regions faster. 480
Synaptic pruning involves selective elimination of unused neural
connections, promotes greater efficiency, speeds neural signals,
and strengthens the brain’s ability to process information. 481
role in the performance of executive functions including short term or working
memory, motor set and planning, attention, inhibitory control and decision
making.”); Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Emotional and Cognitive Changes During
Adolescence, 17 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY, April 2007 at 251, 253 (detailing the correlation between levels of intellectual ability and “brain alterations” during adolescence). See generally SPEAR, supra note 459, at 102–09 (describing changes in cognitive functioning with age).
478. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 37 (“ The
development of the prefrontal cortex is gradual and is not complete until well
into adulthood.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 97 (“[P]refrontal
circuitry implicated in self-regulation and planning behavior continues to develop into young adulthood. . . . This development is slow and linear in nature.”).
479. STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 31–33 (detailing how brain circuitry develops throughout an individual’s life); Steinberg, Dual Systems, supra note
474, at 217 (“As a consequence of synaptic pruning and late continued myelination of prefrontal brain regions, there are improvements over the course of
adolescence in many aspects of executive function, such as response inhibition . . . [and] weighing risks and rewards . . . .”).
480. Myelination and brain growth in the frontal cortex during adolescence
improve brain function by acting like the insulation of a wire to increase the
speed of neural electro-conductivity. See GOLDBERG, supra note 477, at 144 (explaining that “[t]he presence of myelin makes communication between different
parts of the brain faster and more reliable”); SPEAR, supra note 459, at 64 (“[Myelin] allows the electrical impulse to jump from gap to gap, considerably speeding information flow along the axon . . . .”); Zoltan Nagy et al., Maturation of
White Matter is Associated with the Development of Cognitive Functions During
Childhood, 16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1227, 1231 (2004) (“[T]he physiological effects of increases in axon thickness and myelination are similar in that
they both increase conduction speed.”).
481. The pruning and elimination of unused connections promotes greater
efficiency and strengthens the brain’s ability to process complex information.
See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 37 (“ The
pruning that occurs during adolescence contributes to the fine-tuning of brain
connections necessary for adult cognition.”); STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 26
(“Pruning makes the brain function more effectively, the way that thinning a
tree allows the remaining branches to grow stronger.”); Casey et al., Structural
and Functional, supra note 477, at 246 (reporting that “increasing cognitive capacity during childhood may coincide with a gradual loss [of grey matter] rather
than formation of new synapses”); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8175 (2004) (detailing how scans of grey matter
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The limbic system controls emotions, reward-seeking, and
instinctual behavior—the fight-or-flight response. 482 The PFC
and limbic systems mature at different rates and adolescents
rely more heavily on the limbic system—bottom-up emotional
processing—rather than the top-down cognitive regulatory system. 483 The developmental lag between the PFC regulatory system and the reward- and pleasure-seeking limbic system contributes to impetuous behavior driven more by emotions rather
than reason. 484 The imbalance between the impulse-control and
reward-seeking systems contributes to youths’ poor judgment,
impetuous behavior, and criminal involvement. 485
Roper attributed juveniles’ diminished responsibility to
greater susceptibility to peer influences. As their orientation
shifts toward peers, youths’ quest for acceptance and affiliation

in the adolescent brain show that the prefrontal cortex does not mature until
the end of adolescence). See generally SPEAR, supra note 459, at 75–76 (describing how synaptic pruning occurs in the brain); Feld et al., supra note 471 at
189–91 (citing to studies that use brain imaging to measure changes in brain
circuitry).
482. SPEAR, supra note 459, at 68–69 (identifying the components of the limbic system that control learning and emotional response); STEINBERG, supra
note 465, at 72–74 (explaining the function of the limbic system).
483. Feld et al., supra note 471, at 191–93; SPEAR, supra note 459, at 180.
484. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 38 (“ The
limbic system develops on a steeper curve than the prefrontal cortex . . . . The
result can be an imbalance that may favor behaviors driven by emotion and
response to incentives over rational decision making.”); STEINBERG, supra note
465, at 74 (“[S]ensation seeking . . . rises and falls during adolescence, peaking
around age sixteen.”); Dahl, supra note 459, at 64 (“When the control of emotional behavior includes a cognitive process that is abstract in the temporal domain (such as weighing the possibility of a future consequence), these processes
are also likely to engage systems in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.”); Steinberg, Dual Systems, supra note 474, at 221 (noting that “heightened rewardseeking is most clearly and consistently seen during mid-adolescence”); Steinberg, Social Neuroscience, supra note 474, at 96–97 (proposing that maturation
of the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system at different points in adolescence
explains impulsive behavior among adolescents).
485. Feld et al., supra note 471, at 193–94; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at 48–49 (“ This gap in time, between the increase in sensation
seeking around puberty and the later development of ‘regulatory competence,’
may combine to make adolescence a time of inherently immature judgment.”);
Steinberg, Dual Systems, supra note 474, at 222 (“Middle adolescence appears
to be a time of growing vulnerability to risky behavior . . . heightened rewardseeking impels adolescent[s] toward risky activity, and immature self-regulatory capabilities do not restrain this impulse.”); Steinberg, Social Neuroscience,
supra note 474, at 89 (observing that scores on measures of impulse control and
resistance to peer influence improve with age).
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makes them more susceptible to influences than adults.486 Peers
increase youths’ propensity to take risks because their presence
stimulates the brain’s reward centers. 487
Neuroscience research about brain development bolsters social scientists’ observations about adolescents’ impulsive behavior and impaired self-control. Despite impressive advances, neuroscientists have not established a direct link between brain
maturation and behavior, nor have they found ways to individualize assessments of developmental differences.488

486. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 457, at 50 (“ The
drive for affiliation and acceptance at this stage makes adolescents more open
to peer influence . . . .”); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 51 (“[A]s part of
normal emotional development, youths individuate from parents, a process that
sometimes involves engaging in risky behavior that reflects both challenges to
parental control and a shift in orientation from parents to peers.”); SPEAR, supra
note 459, at 155–57 (summarizing research on the social behavior of adolescents); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423, at 120–21 (citing to studies of the
impact of peer influences on juveniles’ behavior).
487. STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 98 (“Just by being around their friends,
adolescents’ heightened sensitivity to social rewards makes them more sensitive
to all kinds of rewards, including the potential rewards of a risky activity.”);
Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 815–17 (discussing empirical research on brain development, peer-influence, and risk-taking behavior).
488. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 46 (“Research directly linking
anatomical brain development with actual behavioral change is still very
sparse . . . .”); STEINBERG, supra note 465, at 4 (“[N]euroscience frequently
doesn’t add to the explanation of human behavior beyond what we already know
from psychology and other social sciences . . . .”); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent
Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 769 (2011)
(reporting that an analysis of claims based on adolescent brain science suggests
that the “persuasive power ” of such science “fall[s] far short of expectations”);
Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 397, 403–06 (2006) (explaining why
brain science should not be the basis for determining responsibility in criminal
cases). See generally Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain
Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 176 (2009) (arguing that
most attempts to introduce developmental neuroscience evidence in the courts
have failed); Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157, 168–70
(Brent Garland ed., 2004) (questioning the ability of neuroscience to show that
individuals can act without forming intent).
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2. Graham v. Florida: Banning LWOP for Nonhomicide
Juvenile Offenders
Prior to Graham v. Florida, the Court asserted that “death
is different.” 489 Graham extended Roper’s diminished responsibility rationale to nonhomicide juvenile offenders who received
LWOP sentences. Graham raised “a categorical challenge to a
term of years sentence”—a life without parole sentence applied
to the category of juvenile offenders. 490 Graham repudiated the
Court’s “death is different” distinction, extended Roper’s reduced
culpability rationale to term-of-year sentences, and “declare[d]
an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence.” 491 Graham rested on three features: offender, offense,
and sentence. It reiterated Roper’s rationale that juveniles’ re-

489. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (reviewing Eighth Amendment case law with respect to the death penalty). See generally Barry C. Feld,
A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS, & PUBLIC POL’Y 9
(2008) [hereinafter Feld, Slower Form of Death] (analyzing the Supreme Court’s
decisions in juvenile death penalty and life without parole cases); Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423 (examining the Supreme Court’s
non-death penalty proportionality framework).
490. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). Graham arose at the intersection of two lines of Eighth Amendment proportionality cases. One line of
cases raised “gross disproportionality” claims and challenged term-of-years sentences that greatly exceeded the seriousness of the crime. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (elaborating upon principles of “narrow proportionality”
review in noncapital cases); Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 286 (1983) (emphasizing that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments
“prohibits . . . sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed” and
that the “constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century”); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284–85 (approving
a mandatory life sentence for a recidivist following his third conviction for minor
property crimes).
The other line of cases made “categorical disproportionality” claims and
challenged imposition of the death penalty on categories of offenders or offenses.
E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2007) (prohibiting execution for raping a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring the execution of
juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring the execution of defendants with mental retardation); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(barring execution for a felony murderer who did not kill or intend to kill the
victim); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the sentencer in a
capital case should not be precluded from considering as mitigating factors the
defendant’s character or the circumstances of the crime); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (barring the execution for rape of an adult woman).
491. Graham, 560 U.S. at 102.
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duced culpability warrants less severe penalties than those imposed on adults convicted of the same crime. 492 Unlike Roper,
Graham explicitly based young offenders’ diminished responsibility on developmental and neuroscience research. 493
Focusing on the offense, Graham invoked the Court’s felony
murder death-penalty decisions and concluded that even the
most serious non-homicide crimes “cannot be compared to murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’” 494 The combination of
diminished responsibility and a nonhomicide crime made a
LWOP sentence grossly disproportional. 495
Finally, the Court equated a LWOP sentence for a juvenile
with the death penalty.496 Graham found no penal rationale—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—justified the penultimate sanction for nonhomicide juvenile offenders. 497 While incapacitation might reduce future offending,
judges cannot reliably predict at sentencing whether a juvenile
will pose a future danger to society. Nevertheless, most states
deny vocational training or rehabilitative services to youths

492. Id. at 67 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568) (“ The juridical exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of offenders at issue
in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”).
493. Id. at 68 (noting that “developments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.
For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature
through late adolescence”).
494. Id. at 69 (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438); see also Coker, 433 U.S. at
598.
495. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (“[W]hen compared to an adult murderer, a
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the
analysis”).
496. Id. at 79 (noting that “life in prison without the possibility of parole
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation
with society, no hope”); Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 67,
69 (2010) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74) (noting the inconsistency between
rehabilitation and an LWOP sentence that “‘forswears altogether ’ the idea that
the defendant can change”); Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It
Is That You Threw Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope
for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 58 (2010) (arguing that the rationale of Graham should also preclude lengthy term-of-years sentences that
deny juveniles hope of release as well).
497. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74.
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serving LWOP sentences in favor of those who might return to
the community. 498
Although Graham adopted a categorical rule, it only required states to provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 499
It did not prescribe states’ responsibility to provide resources
with which to change or specify when youths might become eligible for parole. Parole consideration would not guarantee young
offenders’ release and some might remain confined for life.500
Although Graham barred LWOP for juveniles convicted of a
nonhomicide crime, many more youths are serving de facto life
sentences—aggregated mandatory minima or consecutive terms
totaling fifty to one hundred years or more—than those formally
sentenced to LWOP.501 Some state courts have found that very
long sentences imposed on a juvenile convicted of several nonhomicide offenses do not provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. 502 By contrast, other courts have read Graham narrowly, limiting its holding to formal LWOP sentences, and
upholding consecutive terms that exceed youths’ life expectancy. 503

498. Id. at 79 (noting that “it is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for
parole consideration”); Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note
423, at 298–99; ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2012), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/The-Lives-of-Juvenile-Lifers.pdf (providing statistics on the
number of juvenile lifers who receive rehabilitative programming in prison).
499. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
500. Id. at 82 (“A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release,
but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”).
501. See Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 306
(observing that judges can create “virtual life sentences” by imposing stacked
consecutive terms in lieu of formal LWOP sentences).
502. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d
41, 72 (Iowa 2013).
503. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (identifying a split in
opinion among courts as to “whether Graham bars a court from sentencing a
juvenile nonhomicide offender to consecutive, fixed terms resulting in an aggregate sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy”).
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3. Miller v. Alabama: Banning Mandatory LWOP for
Juveniles Convicted of Murder
When the Court decided Miller v. Alabama, forty-seven
states permitted judges to impose LWOP sentences on any offender—adult or juvenile—convicted of murder.504 In twentyseven states, LWOP sentences were mandatory for those convicted of murder, precluded consideration of actors’ culpability
or degree of participation, and equated juveniles’ criminal responsibility with adults. 505 Courts regularly upheld mandatory
LWOP and extremely long sentences imposed on children as
young as twelve or thirteen years of age. 506 One in six juveniles
504. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 25 (“Only Kentucky, New
York, Oregon, and the District of Columbia specifically exclude anyone under
the age of eighteen who is tried as an adult from life without parole sentencing.”).
505. Id.
506. Id. at 1 (specifying that children as young as ten years old are subject
to prosecution as adults in forty-two states and under federal law); Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 269; Feld, Youth Discount,
supra note 423, at 129 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 25
n.44); see, e.g., Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a
mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on an illiterate, mildly retarded sixteenyear-old murderer, even though the statute excluded consideration of any mitigating factors, including youthfulness, and holding that “we cannot find any
basis in decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment, or in any other sources
of guidance to the meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ for concluding
that the sentence in this case was unconstitutionally severe”); Harris v. Wright,
93 F.3d 581, 583–85 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a fifteen-year-old juvenile’s constitutional challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed for murder); Tate
v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the argument
that “a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual punishment on a twelve-year-old child”); State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979, 984 (La. 1984)
(affirming a LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old juvenile convicted of
rape); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a
LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old); Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d
912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding a LWOP sentence imposed on fourteen-yearold convicted of murder); Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 864, 895–97 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006) (approving a mandatory life sentence imposed on a youth convicted
of murder committed at thirteen years of age), rev’d, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007);
State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C. 1998) (upholding life imprisonment
sentence for a thirteen-year-old convicted of rape, recognizing that “the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in determining
whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime,” but emphasizing that Green was morally responsible for the crime because he possessed sufficient mental capacity to form criminal intent); State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d
325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (upholding a “two-strike” LWOP sentence imposed on a
fifteen-year-old convicted of burglary based on his prior juvenile conviction for
a serious felony, a sentence presumably invalid after Graham); Paul G. Morrissey, Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual
Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in
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who received a LWOP sentence was fifteen years or younger at
the time of their crime; for more than half, it was their first ever
conviction. 507 States may not execute a felony-murderer who did
not kill or intend to kill, but one-quarter to one-half of juveniles
who received LWOP sentences were convicted as accessories to
a felony murder. 508 Although the Supreme Court viewed youthfulness as a mitigating factor, many trial judges treated it as an
aggravating factor and sentenced young murderers more severely than adults convicted of murder.509
Miller v. Alabama extended Roper and Graham and banned
mandatory LWOP for youths convicted of murder. 510 Miller invoked death penalty cases that barred mandatory capital sen-

State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707, 738 (1999) (citing Green, 502 S.E.2d 819)
(explaining that age was not a dispositive factor in the case of State v. Green).
507. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 1.
508. Id. at 27–28; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND
ME HOME”: YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN UPDATE 4 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
crd0112webwcover.pdf.
509. See Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in The
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 377, at 227, 236–37
(comparing the sentences imposed on youths transferred to criminal courts with
those of adults and noting that “transferred youths are sentenced more harshly,
both in terms of the probability of receiving a prison sentence and the length of
the sentences they receive. In other words, we see no evidence that criminal
courts recognize a need to mitigate sentences based on considerations of age and
immaturity”); Kurlychek & Johnson, Juvenility and Punishment, supra note
412, at 747 (reporting that judges sentenced juveniles waived into adult court
more harshly than similar young adult offenders in four states); Tanenhaus &
Drizin, supra note 196, at 665 (citing the impact of “get tough” politics and arguing that “[b]y the mid-1990’s [sic], youth had ceased to be a mitigating factor
in adult court, and instead had become a liability”).
Youths convicted of murder are more likely to enter prison with LWOP sentences than are adults convicted of murder. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 378, at 33 (reporting that judges imposed LWOP sentences on juveniles
convicted of murder more frequently than they did adults and concluding that
“states have often been more punitive toward children who commit murder than
adults . . . age has not been much of a mitigating factor in the sentencing of
youth convicted of murder ”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 508, at 4 (reporting that “in more than half the cases where there was an adult co-defendant, the adult received a lower sentence than the young person who was sentenced to life without parole”).
510. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“Graham, Roper, and our
individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles . . . . [M]andatory-sentencing
schemes . . . violate [the] principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.”).
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tences and required an individualized culpability assessment before a judge could impose LWOP on a juvenile murderer. 511 Miller emphasized that “children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing” and “mandatory penalties, by
their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances
attendant to it.” 512 The Court asserted that once judges considered a youth’s diminished responsibility individually, very few
cases would warrant LWOP. 513
The Court’s recognition that children are different reflected
a belated correction to states’ punitive excesses, but its Eighth
Amendment authority to regulate their sentencing policies is
very limited. Graham and Miller raised as many questions as
they answered. Several years after Miller held mandatory
LWOP unconstitutional, the Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana
resolved lower courts’ conflicting decisions about Miller’s retroactive application to more than 2500 youths sentenced prior to
the decision, and ruled that youths who received a mandatory
LWOP sentence prior to Miller would be eligible for resentencing
or parole consideration. 514

511. Id. at 461 (citing cases within two strands of precedent that underpin
the Court’s decision); see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (holding that “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense”). Woodson condemned:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consideration . . . the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of mankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
Id. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988)) (requiring “reasoned moral response” that
reflects an offender ’s individual culpability), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74 (1987) (requiring the
sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances relative to the offense and the defendant as an individual).
512. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 476.
513. Id. at 479 (noting that “we think appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon”); see also id. at
484 n.10 (observing that “when given the choice, sentencers impose life without
parole on children relatively rarely”).
514. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
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Miller gave lawmakers and judges minimal guidance to
make culpability assessments. The factors it described—age, immaturity, impetuosity, family and home environment, circumstances and degree of participation in the offense, youthful incompetence, and amenability to treatment—enable judges to
make subjective decisions without meaningful controls. 515 As a
result, state courts’ interpretations and legislatures’ responses
to Miller vary substantially. 516
Miller required twenty-eight states and the federal government to revise mandatory LWOP statutes to provide for individualized assessments.517 Some states adopted Miller factors for a
judge to consider; 518 a few states abolished juvenile LWOP sentences entirely; and others replaced them with minimum sentences ranging from twenty-five years to life with periodic reviews, or determinate sentences of forty years to life. 519 Other
states provide age-tiered minimum sentences for parole consideration: twenty-five years for youths fourteen or younger convicted of murder; thirty-five years for those fifteen or older. 520
None of these changes approximate the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code recommendations that juveniles should
be eligible for parole consideration after ten years. 521
State courts are divided over whether Miller applies to mandatory sentences other than murder that preclude consideration
515. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–80 (identifying features of adolescence that
judges should consider when sentencing juvenile offenders).
516. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014) (holding that
Miller requires a trial court to consider how certain attributes of youth may
affect the justification for LWOP sentences as punishment for juveniles); People
v. Chavez, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing LWOP
sentences and remanding for resentencing in the wake of Miller); People v.
Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014) (holding that the rule from Miller does
not apply retroactively); Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 749, 769 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012) (vacating the sentence of life in prison for the commission of seconddegree murder and remanding the case for resentencing; Bear Cloud v. State,
334 P.3d 132, 147 (Wyo. 2014) (ordering the trial court to conduct a “Miller hearing” to resentence the defendant). See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1816–18 (2016) (reviewing state responses to
Miller).
517. Drinan, supra note 516, at 1795.
518. Id. at 1816–17.
519. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT: STATE RESPONSES TO 2012
SUPREME COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 2 (2014); Moriearty, supra note 432, at 975–76 (2015) (describing how states have reformulated sentencing schemes after Miller).
520. Drinan, supra note 516, at 1818.
521. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
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of youthful mitigation. 522 Several post-Miller courts have approved twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentences without
any individualized culpability assessments, 523 whereas others
have found all mandatory minimum sentences violate the state
constitution. 524
Miller’s prohibition of mandatory LWOP may affect transfer
provisions—offense exclusion and prosecutorial direct file—that
do not provide individualized assessments. Both result in automatic adulthood without any knowledge of a juvenile’s circumstances, opportunity to present mitigating evidence, or appellate
review.
C. YOUTH DISCOUNT
There is a straightforward alternative to the confusion and
contradiction reviewed above. States should formally incorporate youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing statutes.
Youthful mitigation does not excuse criminality; it holds juveniles accountable for their crimes, but proportions punishment
to their diminished responsibility.525 Roper and Graham adopted
a categorical prohibition because the Court feared that a judge
or jury could not properly consider youthful mitigation when confronted with a heinous crime. 526
There are two reasons to prefer a categorical rule over individualized discretion. First, judges and legislators cannot define
or identify what constitutes adult-like culpability. Culpability is
not an objectively measurable thing, but a subjective judgment
522. Drinan, supra note 516, at 1818.
523. Id.
524. E.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014) (holding that mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles violate the Iowa Constitution).
525. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 113 (“In order to
achieve [the] goal of proportionality, both the nature of the offense and the culpability of the offender must be taken into account.”); FELD, BAD KIDS, supra
note 1, at 315–16 (reasoning that youthfulness as a mitigating factor requires
proportional punishment); ZIMRING, supra note 23, at 139 (arguing for the general applicability of the doctrine of diminished responsibility in sentencing);
Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423 (arguing that the use of age as a mitigating factor is consistent with the principle of proportionality in sentencing); Scott
& Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 455, at 172–76 (explaining how
policy changes can support a presumption of diminished responsibility without
providing a blanket excuse from responsibility); see also Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398
(“ The Constitutional analysis is not about excusing juvenile behavior, but imposing punishment in a way that is consistent with our understanding of humanity today.”); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 75 (Iowa 2013) (“[W]hile youth is
a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an excuse.”).
526. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
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about criminal responsibility. Development is highly variable—
a few youths may achieve competencies prior to eighteen years
of age, while many others may not attain maturity even as
adults. Despite individual developmental differences, clinicians
lack tools with which to assess youths’ impulsivity, foresight,
and preference for risk, or a metric by which to relate maturity
of judgment with criminal responsibility. 527 The inability to define, measure, or diagnose immaturity or validly to identify a few
responsible youths introduces a systematic bias to over-punish
less culpable juveniles. 528 The law uses age-based categorical
lines to approximate the level of maturity required for particular
activities—voting, driving, and consuming alcohol—and restricts youths without individualized assessments of maturity.
The second reason to adopt a categorical rule of youthful
mitigation is judges’ or juries’ inability to fairly weigh the abstraction of diminished responsibility against the aggravating
reality of a horrific crime. Roper rightly feared that jurors could
not distinguish between a person’s diminished responsibility for
causing a harm and the harm itself, and that the heinousness of
a crime would trump reduced culpability.529 When courts sentence minority offenders, unconscious racial stereotypes compound the difficulties of assessing immaturity. 530 Treating
youthfulness categorically is a more efficient way to address immaturity when every juvenile can claim some degree of diminished responsibility.

527. FELD, EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 140 (“[W]e currently lack the diagnostic tools to evaluate

psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish
young career criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as adults, will repudiate
their reckless experimentation.”).
528. James C. Howell et al., Young Offenders and an Effective Justice System
Response, in FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 85, at 200, 229 (“Despite
adolescents’ developmental differences, clinicians lack the tools with which to
assess youths’ impulsivity, foresight, or preference for risks in ways that relate
to maturity of judgment and criminal responsibility.”); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 154–57 (discussing how courts are trying to develop methods to
assess competence); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 455, at 836.
529. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553–54.
530. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 270–71
(“Racial stereotypes taint culpability assessments, reduce the mitigating value
of youthfulness for children of color, and contribute to disproportionate numbers
of minority youths tried and sentenced as adults.”); see also Moriearty, supra
note 439, at 850–51 (citing studies of racial bias in the juvenile justice system).
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The abstract meaning of culpability, the inability to measure or compare moral agency of youths, administrative complexity of individualization, and the tendency to overweigh harm requires a clear-cut alternative. A categorical youth discount
would give all adolescents fractional reductions in sentence
lengths based on age as a proxy for culpability.531 While age may
be an incomplete proxy for maturity or culpability, no better bases exist on which to distinguish among young offenders. Miller
recognized that same-length sentences exact a greater penal bite
from younger offenders than older ones.532
Imprisonment per se is more developmentally disruptive
and onerous for adolescents than adults. 533 Thus, a statutory
youth discount would require judges to give substantial reductions to youths based on a sliding scale of diminished responsibility with the largest reductions to the youngest offenders.534 If
tried as an adult, a fourteen-year-old would receive a sentence
substantially shorter than that an adult would receive—perhaps
531. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 317 (“A statutory sentencing policy
that integrates youthfulness . . . with principles of proportionality and reduced
culpability would provide younger offenders with categorical fractional reductions of adult sentences.”); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 139 (“ The
uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition argues for the adoption
of . . . a categorical approach in the context of youth crime policy.”); Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, supra note 423, at 322 (“A Youth Discount
would require a judge to give a substantial reduction off of the sentence that she
would impose on an adult convicted of the same crime.”); Feld, Slower Form of
Death, supra note 489, at 55–65 (urging legislators to enact changes in sentencing for juvenile offenders); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 423, at 108 (“A
Youth Discount provides a straightforward way for legislatures to recognize juveniles’ categorically diminished responsibility and formally to incorporate
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing.”). See generally Howell et al.,
supra note 528, at 227–29 (providing policy recommendations for juvenile sentencing practices).
532. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 (2012) (“[LWOP] is an ‘especially
harsh form of punishment for a juvenile,’ because he will almost inevitably serve
‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010))).
533. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different Than for Adults?, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 221, 227 (2001); see also Barry C.
Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 81 (1997) [hereinafter
Feld, Abolish Juvenile Court] (explaining how differences in adolescents’ culpability “raise issues of sentencing policy and fairness”).
534. Feld, Abolish Juvenile Court, supra note 533, at 115–21 (describing how
a youth discount would operate in the courts); Scott & Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, supra note 455, at 837 (proposing a systematic discount in sentencing
for youthful offenders); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 140 (“ The
use of an age category is justified because the presumption of immaturity can
be applied confidently to most persons in the group.”).
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ten or twenty percent of the adult length. A sixteen-year-old
would receive a maximum sentence no more than one-third or
half the adult length. Deeper discounts for younger offenders
correspond with their greater developmental differences in judgment and self-control. A judge can more easily apply a youth discount in states that use sentencing guidelines under which present offense and prior record dictate presumptive sentences. In
less structured sentencing systems, a judge would have to determine the going rate or appropriate sentence for an adult convicted of that offense and then reduce it by the youth discount.
The youth discount’s diminished responsibility rationale
would preclude mandatory, LWOP, or de facto life sentences for
young offenders.535 Although some legislators may find it difficult to resist penal demagoguery, states can achieve all of their
legitimate penal goals by sentencing youths to a maximum of no
more than twenty or twenty-five years for even the most serious
crimes, as recommended by the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code.536 Several juvenile justice analysts and policy
groups have endorsed the youth discount as a straightforward
way to proportionally reduce sentences for younger offenders. 537
535. Howell et al., supra note 528, at 367; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note
1, at 246–47; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 378, at 5–6 (outlining the types of sentences that juveniles receive and why culpability should be
diminished by the youth of the offender).
536. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
537. Several academic analysts have explicitly endorsed my proposal for the
youth discount. See, e.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 246 (“Proportionality supports imposing statutory limits on the maximum duration of adult sentences impose[d] on juveniles—a ‘youth discount,’ to use Feld’s term.”); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 196, at 698 (“We endorse Feld’s proposals [for a youth
discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally
different than adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must
be imposed on serious and violent adult offenders.”); von Hirsch, supra note 533,
at 227 (arguing for categorical penalty reductions based on juveniles’ reduced
culpability).
While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among youths
of the same age, the degree of appreciation we should demand depends
on age: we may rightly expect more comprehension and self-control
from the 17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so that the 17-year-old’s penalty reduction should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of
individualized determinations of a youth’s degree of moral development would be neither feasible nor desirable.
Id. at 226. See also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) Reporter ’s
Note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (acknowledging that the
framework of the MPC’s recommendation for “specialized sentencing rules and
mitigated treatment of juvenile offenders sentenced in adult courts, owes much”
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For example, a National Institute of Justice study group concluded that youths’ diminished responsibility required mitigated
sanctions for youths sentenced as adults. 538 Additionally, the
ABA has condemned juvenile LWOP sentences, and has proposed that statutes formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor, and provide for earlier parole release consideration. 539
CONCLUSION
The time is right to reform juvenile courts’ jurisdiction, jurisprudence, and procedures. Although most states’ juvenile
court jurisdiction extends to youths under eighteen years of age,
North Carolina, for example, sets the boundary at sixteen, and
ten other states set it at seventeen years of age. 540 Developmental psychology and neuroscience research strengthens the case
to raise the age of jurisdiction to eighteen in every state. Indeed,
it would be appropriate to extend to young adults aged eighteen
to twenty-one some of the protections associated with juvenile
courts: shorter sentences like a youth discount, rehabilitative
treatment in separate facilities, protected records, and the like.
Many European countries’ criminal laws provide separate young
adult sentencing provisions and institutions to afford greater leniency and use of rehabilitative measures. 541

to Feld’s proposal for a youth discount—“a sliding scale of developmental and
criminal responsibility”).
538. A study group funded by the National Institute of Justice determined
that “[y]ouths’ diminished responsibility requires mitigated sanctions to avoid
permanently life-changing penalties and provide room to reform.” Rolf Loeber
et al., Overview, Conclusions, and Key Recommendations, in FROM JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 85, at 315, 353. Following the rationale of Roper and Graham, the study group concluded that “[a] categorical rule of youthfulness as a
mitigating factor in sentencing is preferable to individualized discretion.” Howell et al., supra note 528, at 229; David P. Farrington, Rolf Loeber & James C.
Howell, Young Adult Offenders: The Need for More Effective Legislative Options
and Justice Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 729, 743 (endorsing a
“maturity discount” that provides a “decrease in the severity of penalties that
take account of younger persons’ lesser culpability and diminished responsibility”).
539. Stephen Saltzburg, ABA Policies on Youth in the Criminal Justice System, 2008 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 1, 5–6.
540. Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court
Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and
-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx.
541. Loeber et al., supra note 538, at 350–51.
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Most youths involved with the juvenile justice system will
outgrow their youthful indiscretion without significant interventions. We can facilitate desistance by reinforcing the two-track
system—one informal, one formal—proposed by the President’s
Crime Commission a half-century ago. 542 For youths who require
services, diversion to community resources provides a more efficient and flexible alternative to adjudication and disposition. If
states explicitly forgo home removal, then juvenile courts can
use summary processes to make noncustodial dispositions. Scott
v. Illinois prohibits incarceration without representation. 543 Alabama v. Shelton prohibits revocation and confinement of an unrepresented defendant who violated probation. 544 Baldwin v.
New York affords a jury right to any person facing the prospect
of at least six months incarceration. 545 By clearly foregoing home
removal or incarceration dispositions, states can administer a
streamlined justice system for most youths. Diversion raises its
own issues because low-visibility decisions contribute to racial
disparities at the front end.546 States can adopt formal criteria,
542. The President’s Crime Commission suggested that the juvenile court
ultimately might evolve into a two-track system with separate crime control and
social welfare functions. In such a system, public officials would divert and handle informally most minor delinquents and status offenders. “In place of the
formal system, dispositional alternatives to adjudication must be developed for
dealing with juveniles . . . . The range of conduct for which court intervention is
authorized should be narrowed with greater emphasis upon consensual and informal means of meeting the problems of difficult children.” PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 2. The Commission also acknowledged that juvenile
courts intervened to control crime rather than simply to treat youths and recommended that public officials refer more serious offenders for formal adjudication:
The cases that fall within the narrowed jurisdiction of the court and
filter through the screen of prejudicial, informal disposition methods
would largely involve offenders for whom more vigorous measures
seem necessary. Court adjudication and disposition of those offenders
should no longer be viewed solely as a diagnosis and prescription for
cure, but should be frankly recognized as an authoritative court judgment expressing society’s claim to protection. While rehabilitative efforts should be vigorously pursued in deference to the youth of the offenders and in keeping with a general commitment to individualized
treatment of all offenders, the incapacitative, deterrent, and condemnatory aspects of the judgment should not be disguised.
Id.
543. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
544. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
545. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
546. Mears, supra note 137, at 587 (“[C]onsiderable room exists for front-end
decision-making, especially arrest and intake decisions, to contribute to racial
disparities in the processing of young people.”).
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risk assessment instruments, data collection, and ongoing monitoring to rationalize diversion decisions and reduce disparities.
Finally, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Prevention programs that target at-risk youths, families, and communities, have demonstrated efficacy, provide cost-benefit returns,
and would reduce the number of youths referred to juvenile
courts in the first instance.
For delinquents facing custodial restraints—pretrial detention or postconviction confinement—juvenile courts are criminal
courts and require criminal procedural safeguards including the
right to a jury. Increasing protections and costs of formal adjudication provide financial and administrative incentives to divert more youths. Although delinquency sanctions are shorter
than those imposed by criminal courts, it is disingenuous to
claim that they do not pursue deterrent, incapacitative, and retributive goals. Apart from those who pose a risk of flight, states
should reserve secure detention for youths whose offense and
prior record indicate that they likely would be removed from
home if convicted. Risk assessment instruments, other JDAI
strategies, and effective assistance of counsel could reduce pretrial detention and disproportionate minority confinement. Juvenile court interventions should keep youths in their community and avoid out-of-home placements and secure confinement
to the greatest extent possible and use evidence-based programs
to rehabilitate and reintegrate them.
The procedural safeguards of juvenile courts should be
greatly enhanced to compensate for adolescents’ developmental
immaturity: automatic competency assessment for children
younger than fourteen years of age, mandatory presence of counsel during interrogation for those younger than sixteen, and
mandatory nonwaivable counsel for youths in court proceedings.
Any system of justice will fail without a robust public defender
system to enable youths to exercise rights. Delinquents should
enjoy the right to a jury trial to assure reliability of convictions
and to increase the visibility and accountability of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. States should strengthen appellate
oversight of delinquency proceedings. Records of youths should
be easily sealed or expunged to reduce impediments to education
and employment. In keeping with juvenile courts’ rationale to
avoid stigmatizing youths, states should eschew collateral consequences of delinquency convictions.
For those few youths whom policymakers believe should be
tried as adults, a judicial hearing guided by offense criteria and
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clinical considerations and subject to rigorous appellate review
is the only sensible way to make transfer decisions. 547 Criteria
should focus on serious offenses and extensive prior records,
criminal participation, clinical evaluations, and aggravating and
mitigating factors which, taken together, distinguish the few
youths who might deserve sentences substantially longer than
the maximum sanctions that juvenile courts can impose. A judicial hearing will produce better decisions than will politically
motivated prosecutors. Appellate courts should closely review
waiver decisions and develop substantive principles to define a
consistent boundary of adulthood. A legislature should prescribe
a minimum age of eligibility for criminal prosecution.
Developmental psychological and neuroscience research reports a sharp drop-off in judgment, self-control, and appreciation
of consequences as well as in competence to exercise rights for
youths fifteen years of age or younger. The minimum age for
transfer should be sixteen. Sentences of youths convicted as
adults should be substantially reduced—through a youth discount—to reflect their diminished culpability. Once judges
properly consider youths’ generic developmental limitations and
diminished responsibility, there will be very few youths or
crimes for which prosecution as an adult would be appropriate. 548
It will take political courage for legislators to enact laws that
recognize the diminished responsibility of serious young offenders—and even greater political courage when they are charged
with being soft on crime. However, the legislators of the Get
Tough Era produced punitive delinquency sanctions as well as
unjust and counterproductive waiver and criminal sentencing
laws—all of which have had a disproportional impact on youths
of color. The legislators who enacted these laws are obliged to
undo the damage and adopt sensible policies that reflect our
greater understanding of adolescent development—that children are different.
547. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 178–79 (proposing a new standard
for juvenile dispositions in delinquency proceedings); ZIMRING, supra note 23,
at 107–29 (concluding that case-by-case determinations are preferable to categorical transfer rules). See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 208–44
(detailing juvenile transfer policies); Bishop, supra note 418 (discussing automatic and prosecutorial transfer to adult court); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 48, at 195–220 (summarizing research on transfers of juvenile
offenders to criminal courts and sentences to prisons).
548. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (noting that “we think appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles . . . will be uncommon”).

